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Axiomatic Cost and Surplus-Sharing
Abstract
The equitable division of a joint cost (or a jointly produced output) among agents with
different shares or types of output (or input) commodities, is a central theme of the theory of
cooperative games with transferable utility. Ever since Shapley’s seminal contribution in 1953,
this question has generated some of the deepest axiomatic results of modern microeconomic
theory.
More recently, the simpler problem of rationing a single commodity according to a profile of
claims (reflecting individual needs, or demands, or liabilities) has been another fertile ground for
axiomatic analysis. This rationing model is often called the bankruptcy problem in the literature.
This Chapter reviews the normative literature on these two models, and emphasizes their
deep structural link via the Additivity axiom for cost sharing: individual cost shares depend
additively upon the cost function. Loosely speaking, an additive cost sharing method can be
written as the integral of a rationing method, and this representation defines a linear isomorphism
between additive cost sharing methods and rationing methods.
The simple proportionality rule in rationing thus corresponds to average cost pricing and to
the Aumann-Shapley pricing method (respectively in the case of homogeneous or heterogeneous
output commodities). The uniform rationing rule, equalizing individual shares subject to the
claim being an upperbound, corresponds to serial cost sharing. And random priority rationing
corresponds to the Shapley-Shubik method, applying the Shapley formula to the Stand Alone
costs.
Several open problems are included. The axiomatic discussion of non-additive methods to
share joint costs appears to be a promising direction for future research.
JEL : C71, D62, D63




1.1 The problem and some examples
1.2 The proportional method
1.3 Uniform Gains, Uniform Losses, and composition
1.4 The Contested Garment method and Self-Duality
1.5  Consistent and symmetric methods
1.6  Equal sacrifice methods
1.7 Asymmetric methods
1.8 Fixed path methods
1.9 Rationing indivisible goods
1.10 Two variants of the model
2. Sharing variable returns
2.1 The problem and some examples
2.2 Average cost method
2.3 Serial cost sharing
2.4 Additive cost sharing
2.5  Variants of the model
3. Heterogeneous inputs or outputs
3.1 The problem
3.2 Binary demands: the Shapley value
3.3  Variable demands of indivisible goods: the dr-model
3.4  Demand Monotonicity
3.5 Variable demands of divisible goods: the rr-model
3.6 Unit Invariance and Demand Monotonicity in the rr-model
3.7  Nonadditive cost sharing methods4
Introduction
The oldest formal principle of distributive justice is, without a doubt, Aristotle's celebrated
maxim:
Equals should be treated equally, and unequals, unequally in proportion to relevant
similarities and differences
(in the modern rendition by the social psychology literature, see, e.g., Deutsch [1985])
Inspired by the axiomatic approach to the theory of cooperative games (initiated in 1953 by
Shapley's seminal contribution–Shapley [1953]), a considerable research effort explores the
logical limits of the old maxim, within a small number of simple models of fair division. All
such models stage a given production technology and a given set of users of the technology.
Individual users influence the production plan in different ways, either by demanding different
quantities of output, or contributing different quantities of input, or both. When individual
demands (or contributions) are homogeneous (total demand is simply the sum of individual
demands) and the technology has constant returns to scale, the fair distribution of inputs and
outputs among users can and should simply follow Aristotle's proportionality principle.  The
logical challenge is to deal with variable returns of the technology and heterogeneity of the
individual demands/contributions.
This survey of the theory of cooperative production is organized around three basic models,
to which most of the literature is devoted. First we discuss the rationing model (Part 1), where a
given amount of resources (e.g., money) must be divided among beneficiaries with unequal
claims on the resources. In this very bare model, the only available information about the
technology is a single point of the production set. Then we look at a one input - one output
technology (Part 2), where all users consume (possibly different amounts of) a homogeneous
output commodity, and contribute (possibly different amounts of) a homogeneous input
commodity: a typical problem specifies a list of individual demands of output (resp. input
contributions) and the entire production function (with variable returns) and asks to divide fairly
the corresponding input cost (resp. output produced).  In the third model we assume a technology
with a single homogeneous input and one heterogeneous output per agent, (resp. one
homogeneous output and one heterogeneous input per agent), and we speak of the heterogeneous
goods model (Part 3). The formal definition of the cooperative production problem is the same as5
in the homogeneous good models of Part 2: it consists of a list of heterogeneous demands and the
entire production function. The question is to divide fairly the corresponding total input cost
(resp. to divide the output produced, given the list of heterogeneous input contributions and the
technology).
One important feature in the model is whether the input or output commodities come in
indivisible units or are infinitely divisible: we speak of a discrete or real variable, respectively.
Both versions are meaningful and important in applications: the goods on demand may be cars
(discrete) or length of a runway (real); individual contributions may come in days on the job
(discrete) or cash (real) and so on.  Each one of the three models involves two kinds of variables:
the exogeneously given claims/demands (rationing model, Part 1), demands of output or
contributions of input (Parts 2 and 3) on the one hand, and the endogeneously determined shares
of the resources (Part 1) or cost shares or output shares (Parts 2 and 3) on the other hand.  Each
kind of variable can be either discrete (d) or real (r).  In the rationing model (Part 1) the main
model is of the "rr" type (the exogeneous and endogeneous variables are both real) but we also
discuss the dd-model (both kinds of variables are discrete).  In the cost and surplus sharing
models both the rr-model and the dr-model (exogeneous variable is discrete, endogeneous one is
real) play an important role; for instance the classical model of cooperative games is of type dr,
but the theory of Aumann-Shapley pricing happens in the rr-world.
Besides the issue of realism, the choice between a discrete or a real model involves a familiar
trade-off.  A discrete model is mathematically much simpler, as it typically involves no
topological difficulty.  For instance, in the dd-model the set of possible (rationing or cost
sharing) methods is essentially finite; in the dr model, a typical cost sharing method is a linear
operator on a finite dimensional space (see Part 3); in the rr method a cost sharing model is a
linear operator on a functional space.  On the other hand, in the discrete model even the basic
proportionality principle mentioned at the outset is hard to write, it can be approximated at best.
Some comments about the type of axioms we impose are in order.  A few of them convey a
simple idea of equity: of this type are Equal Treatment of Equals and the crucial Dummy axiom
in the heterogeneous goods model expressing some notion of reward. There are also some
incentive compatibility requirements, such as No Advantageous Reallocation in Parts 1 and 2 or
Demand Monotonicity in Part 3.  For the latter axiom, the equity and incentive compatibility
interpretations coexist and reinforce each other.6
Yet the main axiomatic tools throughout the survey are driven neither by equity nor
incentives.  They are properties of structural invariance expressing the commutativity of the
allocation method with respect to certain variations in the cost or surplus sharing problem under
scrutiny.  For instance Consistency, the leading axiom in Part 1, requires the method to commute
with a variation in the society of agents concerned.  Additivity, by far the most important axiom
in Parts 2 and 3, is commutativity of the cost sharing method with respect to the sum of cost
functions.  Scale Invariance and Unit Invariance (Part 3) are about changing the unit in which a
particular good is measured.  And so on.
The structural invariance axioms are the powertools of the mathematical analysis, the
backbone of the most interesting characterization results.  The most spectacular example is the
Additivity axiom in Parts 2 and 3.  The entire set   of rationing methods studied in Part 1 is
shown to be linearly isomorphic to the set of additive cost sharing methods in the homogeneous
good model (Theorem 2.2) and isomorphic to the extreme points of the (convex) set of additive
cost sharing methods in the heterogeneous goods model (Theorems 3.1 and 3.3).  This double
isomorphism allows us to follow the "same" allocation method in the three different models: the
proportional rationing method (Part 1) becomes average cost sharing in Part 2 and the Aumann-
Shapley method in Part 3; the uniform gains method in Part 1 becomes serial cost sharing in
Parts 2, 3; priority rationing (Part 1) becomes incremental cost sharing in Parts 2,3.  New
methods emerge as well: uniform losses rationing suggests the dual serial cost sharing method.
The main lesson to be learned from this overview is that the powerful structural invariance
axioms are double-edged swords.  For instance Additivity with respect to cost functions implies
an isomorphism between cost sharing and rationing methods, but it also severely limits the
choices open to the mechanism designer.  When a structural invariance axiom such as Additivity
conflicts with a set of reasonable equity and/or incentives requirements, we feel that the
invariance axiom must be the first to go.  This opens up the question of finding a less restrictive
version of the invariance axiom, for which the impossibility result becomes a limited possibility
result.  A good example is the new and yet hardly explored space of nonadditive cost sharing
methods: Section 3.7.
Relation to other chapters in the Handbook
In the current chapter, we view the users of the technology as entirely passive: they have
inelastic demands of output, or input contributions, or claims. The axiomatic analysis is supposed7
to enlighten a benevolent dictator on the possible interpretations of fairness when dividing cost
or output, or whatever resources must be split among the participants. Another approach sees the
users as rational microeconomic agents, endowed with classical preferences and choosing
independently and strategically the amount of output they want to consume or of input they
choose to contribute. Any given division method (whether or not it is fair in the sense of this
chapter) yields a specific noncooperative demand game (resp. input contribution game) where a
user’s cost share depends on the entire profile of demands (resp. his output share depends on the
profile of contributions). In this view a division method is a decentralization device: each user
knows his own preferences but may be completely unaware of other users' preferences. The
general results of Chapter 5, Vol. 1 on mechanism design and of Chapter 23, Vol. 2 on
strategyproofness become then relevant.  In particular the incentives properties of the uniform
gains rationing method (and more generally of the fixed path methods: see Section 1.8) are
reinterpreted in Chapter 23, Vol. 2 in the context of the fair division problem with singlepeaked
preferences: there they mean that the direct revelation of preferences is a strategyproof
mechanism.  Similarly, serial cost sharing (and more generally the fixed path generated methods
in Part 3) gives rise to a strategyproof social choice function whenever the cost function is
supermodular.
The second important link is with Chapter 26, Vol. 2, on fair allocation and 20, Vol. 2, on
fair compensation.  A third way to look at the cooperative production problem is as a special
instance of the social choice problem in a particular economic environment. The social planner
takes into account the technology (production set) and the whole profile of individual
preferences, then selects a first best (Pareto efficient) allocation that he deems optimal. One way
to do so is by defining a full fledged social preference over the set of feasible allocations in the
economy: Chapter 16, Vol. 2, explains why this approach will lead, in most models, to a
conceptual dead-end in classical Arrowian fashion. An alternative route is to simply select one
(efficient) allocation by means of fairness axioms: this is the route taken in Chapter 26, Vol. 2,
for a general family of allocation problems that includes cooperative production; this is also the
approach taken in Chapter 20, Vol. 2, for a family of models very close to our homogeneous
goods problems.  The main difference is that in the first best approach the social choice function
selects the shares of output as well as the shares of input from the profile of individual
preferences: therefore the profile of cost shares, say, depends on more than the profile of8
demands and the cost function, and a formula such as the Shapley-Shubik method is generally
not relevant.
1. Rationing
1.1. The problem and some examples
A rationing problem is a triple ( , , ) Ntx where N is a finite set of agents, the nonnegative real
number t represents the amount of resources to be divided, the vector xx iiN = ∈ ()  specifies for
each agent i a claim xi, and these numbers are such that
00 ≤≤ ≤
∈
∑ xi t x ii
iN
 for all  ;
A solution to the rationing problem is a vector  yy iiN = ∈ ( ) , specifying a share  yi for each
agent i and such that
0 ≤≤ =
∈
∑ yx i yt ii i
iN
 for all  ;
The crucial inequality  ii yx ≤  may not be meaningful if claims are subjective evaluations of
needs (or responsibility): an agent may underestimate his “objective” need (or responsibility),
prompting the social planner to violate the above inequality. Our model ignores this possibility:
thus it is the most convincing when the claims  i x  are “objectively” measured, as in the case of a
contractual debt.
Several of the axiomatic properties of rationing methods pertain to variations in the
population (also called society) N of concerned agents.  See the merging properties in Section
1.2 and the consistency property playing the leading role from Section 1.3 onward.  Therefore
the formal model must specify the set  of potential agents from which a certain subset N is
selected to generate an actual problem.  In general,  could be finite or infinite, although the
“real” society N is always finite.  One exception is the discussion of symmetric and consistent
rationing methods in Section 1.4: there we must assume that the set   is infinite.
It is neither easy nor necessary at this stage to interpret a rationing problem directly as a
model of cooperative production. The link of the rationing model with cooperative production
will become apparent in Part 2, when we discuss the implications of the powerful Additivity
axiom in the homogeneous goods model of cost and surplus sharing: see Theorem 2.2.9
Inheritance problems provide the oldest example on record of the rationing problem (see
O'Neill [1982] and Rabinovich [1973] borrowing examples from the Babylonian Talmud): here t
is the liquidation value of the bankrupt firm and xi is the debt owed to creditor i (see Aumann
and Maschler [1985]).
Taxation is another important example: now t is total tax to be levied and xi is agent i's fiscal
liability (see Young [1988] [1990]). Note that in a taxation example, the resources to be divided
are a “bad,” whereas they are a “good” in a inheritance or bankruptcy story. A microeconomic
example similar to taxation is the cost sharing of an indivisible public good: t is the cost of the
good and xi is the benefit to agent i.
Rationing occurs in markets where the price of a commodity is fixed (for instance, at zero): t
is the available supply and xi is agent i's demand of good i (Benassy [1982] Drèze [1975]).
Medical triage is an example: t measures the available medical resources and xi is the quantity
needed by agent i for full treatment (Winslow [1992]). Rationing food among refugees is similar:
xi measures a nutritional need, and t the nutritional value of the available food. The supply chain
problem is a management example: the central supplier collects orders from its retailers and can
not meet all demands at once (Cachon and Larivière [1996]).
Often the resources to be divided come in indivisible units: organs for transplants, seats in
crowded airplanes or in popular sports events, visas to potential immigrants (Elster [1992]) as
well as cars allocated by General Motors to its car dealers. In this case xi and t are integers, e.g.,
in the case of organs or visas xi can only be 0 or 1. Important examples where xi and t are
integers come from queuing and scheduling: a server can process one job per unit of time and
agent i requests xi jobs; at any time t such that tx i ≤∑ , the service protocol solves a rationing
problem.
A rationing method r associates to any rationing problem ( , , ) Ntx a solution  yr N t x = (, ,) .
We study rationing methods with the axiomatic methodology. In the main model, that we call the
rr-model, all variables tx y ii , ,  vary over the nonnegative real line, and correspond to divisible
resources, claims, demands, etc. Sections 1.2 to 1.8 are devoted to the rr-model. In Section 1.9
we study the dd-model where tx y ii , ,  are all nonnegative integers.10
We denote by   the set of rationing methods with a given potential population .  When
required for clarity, we indicate whether claims and shares are discrete or real variables, e.g.,
   means that claims are integer valued and shares are real valued.
All rationing methods discussed below satisfy the following property
Resource Monotonicity (RM)
{} { ( , , ) ( , , ) }     , ,     t t r N t x r N t x for all N t t and x ′′ ′ ≤⇒ ≤
This is a mild and compelling requirement: when resources (whether desirable or not)
increase, no one should see his share reduced.  In most of the results below, Resource
Monotonicity needs not be assumed and follows from the other axioms (e.g., Upper Composition
(1.4) implies RM); exceptions are Theorems 1.4 and 1.6.
With the exception of Section 1.7, all methods are equitable in the sense that they do not
discriminate a priori between the agents. This corresponds to the two familiar axioms:
Equal Treatment of Equals:
xx yy N x t i j N ij ij =⇒= ∈  for all   and all  ,, ,
Symmetry:
yr N t x x iN i =∈ (, ,) ,  is a symmetric function of the variables 
Note that Symmetry implies Equal Treatment of Equals.
An important operation is the duality operator transforming gains into losses. If r is a
rationing method, its dual method r* is defined as
rN t x xr N x t x N t x N
*(, ,) (, ,) , , =− −  for all 




∑ ).  Given x, the method r* allocates t units of “gains”
exactly as r allocates the corresponding losses ( ) xt N − .
Overview of Part 1. The proportional rationing method is characterized in Section 1.2 by
the property that it treats claims as anonymous transferable “bonds”.  In Section 1.3 we discuss
two important methods equalizing respectively the gains and losses on individual claims and
introduce the Upper and Lower Composition axioms.  The celebrated Contested Garment
method inspired by a bargaining interpretation of the rationing model is the subject of Section
1.4.  The next two Sections focus on the structural invariance axiom called Consistency, leading
to the characterization of parametric methods in Section 1.5, and of the equal sacrifice methods11
in Section 1.6. Section 1.7 discusses the rich family of asymmetric methods meeting Consistency
Upper and Lower Composition. Fixed path methods, discussed in Section 1.8, are another family
of asymmetric methods, that play a crucial role in Part 3. The probabilistic rationing of
indivisible goods is the discrete variant of the rationing model: see Section 1.9. Finally, Section
1.10 discusses the variant of the rationing problem where the available resources may exceed the
sum of individual claims.
1.2. The proportional method
With the exception of Section 1.9, all variables tx y ii ,  and   are real numbers: we are in the rr-
model.  The proportional rationing method is defined as follows:
  ( , , )   whenever  0 N
N
t
yp r N t x x x
x
== ⋅ >
(whenever xN = 0, all rationing methods select  y = 0)
Several related characterizations of the proportional rationing method pertain to the
possibility of merging a subset of agents into a single agent with the combined demand, or,
conversely, to split one single agent into several smaller agents.  These results are all related to
the fact that proportional rationing “discounts” each unit of claim/demand by the same factor,
irrespective of who presents this unit of claim/demand (whether the agent has a large or small
global demand is irrelevant).  Hence the proportional method is compelling when claims are
transferable like anonymous bonds.  Any other method is vulnerable to manipulations by
transferring claims across agents or changing their identity by adding “artificial” agents.
For a given set N of agents and a subset S, SN ⊆ , we denote by N S []  the set with
(| | | | ) NS −+ 1  agents where all agents in S have been “merged” into a single agent denoted S*.  For
instance:
[] { 1,2,3,4,5}, {2,4,5} { 1, *,3 }
S NS N S == ⇒ =
For any x in R+




∑ , [] projection of x on S
+ R ; and x S S [] []
∈R+
N  is







[] , =∉ =  if  .  Now we consider four independence properties of
increasing notational complexity; yet, by Theorem 1 below, they are logically equivalent in  .12
No Advantageous Reallocation (NAR)
[] [] For all  , , all   and all  , : ( , , ) ( , , )
SS
SS NS t xx x x r Ntx r Ntx ′′ ′ =⇒ =  (1.1)
This says that by reallocating individual demands among the agents in S, the total share of
this coalition is unchanged, thus preventing such maneuver to be profitable.
Irrelevance of Reallocations (IR)
[] [] For all  , , all   and all  , : { ( , , ) ( , , ) for all  \ }
SS
jj NS t xx x x r Ntx r Ntx j N S ′′ ′ =⇒ = ∈
Reallocations of demands do not affect agents outside the scope of the reallocation.
Independence of Merging and Splitting (IMS)
[] [] [] For all  , , all   and all  : ( , , ) ( , , )
SS S NS t x rNtx rN tx =
The merging operation is the move from N to N S [] ; splitting is the converse transformation.
By repeated applications of Independence of Merging and Splitting we get the following
property.  Assume ( ) NkkM ∈  is a partition of N and let xx → * be the "merging" mapping from
R+
N  into  M
+ R  given by
xx k M kN k
* =∈  for all 
Then ( , , ) ( , , *) for all 
k Nk r Ntx r Mtx k M =∈ .  The next property provides a more precise
decomposition of the rationing method by means of a partition.
Decomposition (DEC)
[] []
For any   and any partition ( ) of  , for all  , all   and all  :
( , , ) ( , , ) where  ( , , *)
kk
kk M
Nk k N k k
NN N t x k
rNtx rN t x t r Mtx
′′ ∈
==
We compute first the shares of the members ( ) Nk  of the partition, and then allocate each
share within the relevant coalition.
Theorem 1.1. Assume N contains three agents or more.  The proportional method meets all
four properties NAR, IR, IMS, and DEC.  Conversely the proportional method is the only
rationing method meeting any one of the four above properties.
The characterizations gathered in Theorem 1.1 are inspired from similar results by Banker
[1981], O'Neill [1982], Moulin [1987] and Chun [1988].  See also Chun [1999] and de Frutos
[1999]. Remarkably, the symmetry properties (such as Equal Treatment of Equals) are not used.13
In Section 1.4, another characterization of the proportional rationing method is based on the
fact that it is self-dual (* ) rr = , that is to say it allocates gains and losses in exactly the same way
(Proposition 1.6).
1.3. Uniform Gains and Uniform Losses
This pair of rationing methods are as important and (almost) as simple as the proportional
method.  They aim at equalizing, respectively, the actual “gains”  yi and the net losses ( ) xy ii −
across agents, under the feasibility constraints of a rationing method:
The Uniform Gains method ug:
yu g N t x x x t ii i i
N
== = ∑ ( , , ) min{ , } min{ , } λλ λ   where   is the solution of 
The Uniform Losses method ul:
yu l N t x x x t ii i i
N
== − − = ++ ∑ (, ,)( ) ( ) µ µ µ   where   is the solution of 
(where ( ) max{ ,0}). zz + =  In the literature, these two methods are often called Constrained
Equal Awards, and Constrained Equal Losses.
For a given rationing problem ( , , ) Ntx, let us denote by Y the set of feasible solutions:
YNtx y y x ii yt i
N
(, ,){ | } =∈ ≤≤ = ∑ R+
N 0    and
One checks easily that ug N t x ( , , ) is the unique solution maximizing over YNtx (, ,)  t h e
"leximin" ordering; that is, it lexicographically maximizes the smallest coordinate  yi, then the
next smallest coordinate and so on.  Similarly, ul N t x ( , , ) is the unique maximizer of the
"leximin" ordering applied to the vector of losses () xy ii − .
The pair { , } ug ul  is a dual pair: ul ug ug ul == **  and  .  This important fact allows a parallel
axiomatic treatment of these two methods.
Both methods ug, ul, as well as pr and all other symmetric methods discussed below, respect
the natural order of gains and losses.  That is, they meet the following two axioms
Ranking x x y y ij ij : ≤⇒≤ (1.2)
Ranking x x x y x y ij i i jj *: ( ) ( ) ≤⇒− ≤ − (1.3)14
The two axioms above are dual, namely a rationing method r satisfies one axiom if and only
if the dual method r* satisfies the dual axiom.
Although both methods ug, ul agree on the ranking of absolute gains and losses, they differ



























Proposition 1.1. The uniform gains method is Progressive, but not Regressive.  It is the most
progressive method among those satisfying Ranking.
The uniform losses method is Regressive, but not Progressive.  It is the most regressive
method among those satisfying Ranking*.
(The precise definition of “the most progressive” is left to the reader.)
Our next pair of dual axioms plays a very important role throughout this Part. They are
structural invariance properties (see Introduction) allowing to decompose the computation of
shares when the available resources are estimated from above or from below:
Upper Composition (UC):
For all  ,  and  , : {0 } { ( , , ) ( , , ( , , ))} N Nx tt t t x rNtx rNtrNt x ′′ ′ ≤≤ ≤ ⇒ = (1.4)
Lower Composition (LC):
F o r  a l l   , a n d   ,: { 0 } { (, , ) (, , ) (, , (, , ) ) N Nx tt t t x rNtx rNtx rNt tx rNtx ′′ ′ ′ ′ ≤≤ ≤ ⇒ = + − − (1.5)
If we allocate first the resources  ′ t , and later it appears that the available resources are
actually lower, namely t, Upper Composition allows to simply take the optimistic shares
rNt x (,,) ′  as the initial demands from which to further ration until t.  We may forget about the
initial demands x once we know an upper bound of the actual resources.  Note that UC implies
Resource Monotonicity.
Dually, if we know a lower bound  ′ t  of the actual resources t, Lower Composition allows to
distribute the pessimistic shares rNt x (,,) ′ , subtract these shares from the initial demands and
distribute the balance ( ) tt − ′  according to the reduced claims  xr N t x − ′ (,,) .
Proposition 1.2. The three methods pr, ug and ul meet the two axioms Upper Composition
and Lower Composition.15
The family of methods meeting UC and LC is large: in Section 1.7 we describe a rich set of
such methods, and we show  with the help of additional requirements  that our three basic
methods pr, ug and ul play a central role within this family: Corollary to Theorem 1.5.  For the
time being, we state two pairs of dual characterizations of ug and ul. They are technically simple,
but their interpretation is quite interesting. In the following statement, we omit the variable N
that plays no role.
Independence of Claim Truncation (ICT)
For all  , , : ( , ) ( , ) where ( ) min{ , } ii N t x r t x r t xt xt x t =∧ ∧ =
The part of one’s claim that is not feasible has no influence on the allocation of the resources:
Composition from Minimal Rights (CMR)
\ For all  , , : ( , ) ( , )   ( ( , ), ( , )), where  ( , ) ( ) Ni N i Ntx rtx mtx r t m tx x mtx mtx t x + =+ − − = −
Agent i’s minimal claim  ( , ) i mtx is this part of the resources that he will receive, even in the
most pessimistic case where the claims of all other agents are met in full. CMR is the special
case of LC where  ' ( , ) N tm t x = .
Proposition 1.3. (Dagan [1996], Herrero and Villar [2000]). The Uniform Gains method is
characterized by the two properties Lower Composition and Independence of Claim Truncation.
The Uniform Losses method is characterized by Upper Composition and Composition for
Minimal Rights.
A different approach uses a priori bounds on individual shares, namely bounds that do not
depend on the size of other agent’s claims. We denote by  Nn =  the cardinality of N.
Lower Bound: for all   and all  Ntx i y rNtx x
t
n
ii i , ,, : (, ,) m i n {,} =≥







N ,, , : ( ,, ) { ( ) } =≤ + − +
It is plain that ug meets the Lower but not the Upper Bound, whereas ul meets the Upper but
not the Lower Bound.  Lower Bound says that agent i is guaranteed a fair share of the resources
unless he demands no more than the fair share, in which case his demand is met in full.
Dually, Upper Bound states that agent i’s loss  ii xy −  is not smaller than the average deficit
N xt − , unless his claim is smaller than the average deficit, in which case he gets no resources.16
The Lower Bound has a lot of bite when t is small; if tn x ii ≤⋅ min { }, Lower Bound forces
equal gains:  yt n i i = /  for all  .  Similarly, if t is close enough to xN , Upper Bound forces equal
losses:
{m i n { } } { , } xn xt x x y xy i j Ni i N i i j j −⋅ ≤≤ ⇒ − = −  all 
Note that for || N = 2, Lower Bound characterizes the ug method, and (by duality) Upper
Bound characterizes the ul method.  This simple fact does not extend to the case | | N ≥ 3;
however, we can still characterize the ug method if we bring Lower Composition to the rescue.
Consider the following very mild requirement:
Zero Consistency:
[\ ] [\ ] For all  , ,  and all  : { 0} { ( , , ) ( \ , , )} iN i N i Ntx i x rNtx rN itx =⇒ =  (1.6)
It is hard to imagine under what circumstances the presence of a null demand agent (who
therefore receives nothing) could influence the allocation of resources among the other, active
agents.
Proposition 1.4. The Uniform Gains method is characterized by the following three
properties: Lower Bound, Lower Composition and Zero-Consistency.
The Uniform Losses method is characterized by the three properties, Upper Bound,
Upper Composition and Zero-Consistency.
1.4. The Contested Garment method and Self Duality
The contested garment method is a rationing method for two agents only, in the vein of the
familiar "split the difference" principle for two person bargaining.  The interpretation of xi as the
verifiable claim of agent i (as opposed to a vague demand) is required for the application of the
cg method and its n-person extensions.  The method is inspired by the following two quotes from
the Babylonian Talmud (see O'Neill [1982], Aumann and Maschler [1985]): "R. Tahifa, the
Palestinian, recited in the presence of R. Abbahu: two [people] cling to a garment; [the decision
is that] one take as much as his grasp reaches and the other take as much as his grasp reaches and
the rest is divided equally between them.”  “Two hold a garment . . . if one of them says, 'It is all
mine' and the other says, 'Half of it is mine,' . . . the former then receives three quarters and the
latter receives one quarter.”17
Consider a two person rationing problem ( , , ) tx x 12 .  We can interpret agent i's "grasp"
optimistically as min{ , } xt i  (in case his own claim takes absolute priority over the other claim)
or pessimistically as () tx j − +  (if the other agent gets his full claim).  Then we split the
remaining deficit (case of optimistic claims) or surplus (case of pessimistic claims).  Both
computations yield the same method:
yx t t x tx t
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The Contested Garment method is self-dual,  * rr = , namely it allocates gains and losses in
exactly the same way. This property follows at once from the optimistic and pessimistic formulas
above:
11 2 1 1 1 2 2
11
*( , ) ( ( ) ( ) ) ( ( ) ( ) )
22
N rt x x x txt xt t x t x x t x ++ + + =− − − − + − = ++− −−−
and the identity  ( ) min{ , } zz t z t + +− = .
The Contested Garment method is self-dual, * rr = , namely it allocates gains and losses in
exactly the same way. This property follows at once from the optimistic and pessimistic formulas
above:
11 2 1 1 1 2 2
11
*( , ) ( ( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( )
22
N rt x x x txt xt tx t x x t x ++ + + =− − − − + − = =+− −−−
and the identity  ( ) min{ , } zz t z t + +− = .
On the other hand, the Contested Garment method fails Upper Composition and (by duality)
Lower Composition: property (1.4) fails for  12 10, 20,  15  and  ' 18. xxt t == = =18
Note that cg coincides with ug for small t, i.e.,  12 min{ , } tx x ≤ , and with ul for large t, i.e.,
12 max { , } . xx t ≤  More importantly, cg shares the two invariance properties used above to
capture ug and ul:
Proposition 1.5. (Dagan [1996])
The Contested Garment method is characterized by Self-Duality and Independence of Claim
Truncation; or by Self-Duality and Composition from Minimal Rights; or by Equal Treatment of
Equals, Independence of Claim Truncation, and Composition from Minimal Rights.
Compare this result, for two-person problems, with the following compact characterization of
the proportional method, for problems of arbitrary size.
Proposition 1.6. (Young [1988])
The proportional method is characterized by Self Duality and Upper Composition; or by Self
Duality and Lower Composition.
Two natural extensions of the cg method for an arbitrary number of agents have been
proposed.  The first one relies on the observation that for 2 n = , the cg method is the average of
the two priority methods.  The 12-priority method is the rationing method (denoted prio(12)) that
gives absolute priority to agent 1 over agent 2, hence:
if   is such that 
if   is such that 
tt x y t
tx t x x y x t x
≤=
≤≤ + = −
1
11 2 1 1
0 :( , )
:( , )
Define symmetrically the 21-priority method prio(21) and notice that formula (1.7) defining
cg can be written as:







Hence the first generalization of cg as the Random Priority method, namely the arithmetic
average of the priority methods over all orderings of N.  Let σ  be an ordering of N as
(,,, ) σσ σ 12  n , namely σ1 is the highest priority agent and so on.  We define
yp r i o N t x = () (, ,) σ  as follows:









































prio N t x N = ∑
1
!
() (, ,) σ
σ
  where the sum bears on all orderings of  (1.9)
The second natural extension of cg to any n uses an explicit mixture of the uniform gains and
uniform losses methods.  This is the Talmudic rationing method due to Aumann and Maschler
[1985] (who argue convincingly that its intuition was present already in the ancient Talmudic
literature)
Talmudic method:
y tal N t x ug N t
xx
ul N t
xx NN == + − + (, ,) (, m i n { , } ,) (, ( ) ,)
22 2 2
(1.10)
The Talmudic method halves each claim and follows Uniform Gains until each half claim is
met.  It then applies the Uniform Losses method to the remaining half claims.  The Talmudic
method coincides with cg in the case of two agents – yet another equivalent formulation of cg.
Both the Talmudic and Random Priority methods are self-dual. Both coincide with Uniform
Gains whenever tx ii ≤ min { } and with Uniform Losses whenever tx iN i ≥ max { } \ .
The next result shows a remarkable relation between the two methods, Random Priority and
Talmudic, and the two most important value solutions for cooperative games, namely the
Shapley value and the nucleolus.  These solutions are defined in Section 3.2 and 3.6 respectively.
Fix a rationing problem ( , , ) Ntx and define two (dual) cooperative games, generalizing the
bargaining interpretation of the contested garment:
for all   (optimistic grasp)
 (pessimistic grasp)
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Note that vN wN t () () == .
Theorem 1.2. (O'Neill [1982], Aumann and Maschler [1985])
i) The Random Priority method allocates the resources according to the Shapley value of the
above games.20
ii) The Talmudic method allocates the resources according to the nucleolus of the above
games.
1.5. Consistent and symmetric methods
The axiom of Consistency has played a major role in the recent microeconomic literature on
distributive justice, see Chapter 26, Vol. 2.  See also the surveys by Thomson [1990] and
Maschler [1990].  Consistency in the rationing problem is both very natural and extremely
powerful, as demonstrated by the results of this and the next subParts.
Consistency (CSY):
[\ ] [\ ] For all  , , , all  , all  : ( \ , ( , , ) , ) ( , , ) SN S N S NSS N t xrN St r Ntx x rNtx ⊆− =  (1.11)
Equivalently, Consistency can be defined by looking at coalitions S with a single agent i:
rN it rNtx x rNtx iN i N i ( \ , ( ,, ) , ) ( ,, ) [\ ] [\ ] −=
The axiom says that upon removing one (or several) agent from the society N, and taking
away the resources allocated to this agent (or agents) within N, the allocation of shares within the
reduced society remains the same.  In other words, changing the status of an agent from "active
participant" to "passive expense of resources" does not alter the overall distribution; removing
one agent and his share of resources is of no consequence to other agents.  Thus Consistency is a
decomposition property with respect to changes in the set of relevant agents.
Note that Consistency is a self-dual axiom: a rationing method is consistent if and only if its
dual method is consistent as well.
In this Section we discuss symmetric methods only.  In this family a powerful
characterization result of (essentially) all consistent methods is available.
Our first result says that Consistency allows us to extend in at most one way a two person
symmetric rationing method.
Proposition 1.7. Let  12 ({1,2})( ,( , )) r t x x  be a rationing method defined for two person
problems only. Assume that  ({1,2}) r  is symmetric and resource monotonic. Then there is at
most one consistent rationing method r (defined for all finite societies N) that coincides with
r({1,2}) for all two- person problems. Moreover, r is symmetric and resource monotonic.21
The discussion of parametric methods below establishes that pr, ug, ul as well as the
Talmudic rationing method are consistent (of course this claim can be checked directly).
Therefore Proposition 1.6 has the following corollaries:
i) the Talmudic method is the only consistent extension of the contested garment method
(for two-person problems) to an arbitrary number of agents,
ii) the Uniform Gains method is the only consistent method satisfying Lower Bound




 for two agents problems, (and a dual statement holds for Uniform Losses by
Proposition 1.4).
Proposition 1.7 begs the question: what symmetric two person rationing methods can be
extended to a (symmetric) consistent method for an arbitrary number of agents?  A general
answer is given by Dagan and Volij [1997] and Kaminski [2000]: a certain binary relation
associated with the two person method must be transitive. Theorem 1.3 below gives a much
more transparent answer under one additional mild requirement:
Continuity
rNtx tx N (, ,) ( ,) ,  is continuous in   for all  (1.12)
We define now the family of parametric rationing methods.  They are the key to Theorem
1.3.  Let  fz (,) λ  be a real valued function of two real variables, with 0 0 ≤≤ ≥ λ Λ and z ; the
Upper Bound Λ  may be finite or infinite.  We assume:
(0, ) 0 ; ( ; ) ( , ) is nondecreasing and continuous in   over [0, ] fz f zz fz λλ =Λ = Λ  (1.13)
To any such function f we associate a unique rationing method r as follows
For all  , , : ( , , ) ( , ) where   is a solution of  ( , ) ii i
iN
Ntx rNtx f x f x t λλ λ
∈
== ∑
(this equation may have an interval of solutions λ  but they all give the same shares to every
agent). We call r the parametric method associated with f.  By construction a parametric method
is symmetric; clearly, it is consistent as well.
The three basic methods pr, ug and ul are parametric, for the following functions f:
Proportional: f z z (,) . λλ ==  and Λ 1
Uniform Gains:  f z z (,) m i n {,} λλ == + ∞  and Λ
Uniform Losses:  fz z (,) ( ) λ
λ
=− = + ∞ +
1
 and Λ22
Among the two extensions of cg discussed in Section 1.4, the Random Priority method is not
consistent, whereas the Talmudic method is consistent.  To check the former claim, take
N ={, ,} 123 , tx == 10 6 810 , ( , , ) and compute the shares allocated under Random Priority:
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Next remove agent 3 and his share 4 1
3 , which leaves us with the reduced problem:
Nt x \{}, , ( , ) 35 6 8 2
3 ′ = ′ = .  Now the shares under Random Priority are:  ′ = ′ = yy 12
5
6 2.
To check the latter claim, we show that the Talmudic method is parametric.  Set Λ=2 and
















































The next result establishes that parametric methods capture, essentially, all consistent and
symmetric rationing methods.
Theorem 1.3. (Young [1987])  A parametric method is a consistent and symmetric rationing
method.  Conversely, a rationing method satisfying Equal Treatment of Equals, Consistency and
Continuity can be represented as a parametric method where  f z (,) λ  is continuous in both
variables.
Note that in the converse statement, it is enough to assume pairwise consistency, namely the
restriction of property (1.11) to subsets S containing two agents.  On the other hand, the converse
statement holds only if we assume that the size of the set N can be arbitrarily large, that is to say,
the set   of potential agents must be infinite.  This is an important limitation of Theorem 1.3 as
well as of Theorem 1.4, in the next Section that does not apply to Theorem 1.5 in Section 1.7.
The class of parametric methods is very rich. Chun, Schummer and Thomson [1998], for
instance, discuss a method of egalitarian inspiration much different from any of the methods
discussed in this survey.23
1.6. Equal Sacrifice Methods
The equal sacrifice methods are an important subset of the parametric ones.  They appear
early on in the discussion of equitable taxation schedules (see Mill [1859] and the discussion in
Young [1990]).
Fix a real valued function uz ( ) of the nonnegative real variable z, and suppose that u is
continuous and strictly increasing.  Think of u as a reference utility function.  Loosely speaking,
the equal sacrifice rationing method associated with u is defined by solving for all Ntx ,,  t h e
following system of equations:
ux uy ux uy ij N y t ii j j i
iN
() () () ( ) , −=− ∈ =
∈
∑  for all   and  (1.14)
Because u is strictly increasing, the above system has at most one solution.  Assume for a
moment that such a solution exists.  Then at the allocation y, each and every agent contributes an
equal "sacrifice," namely the same net utility loss measured along the reference utility scale u.
This is especially appealing in the context of taxation.  Let xi be agent i's taxable income,  yi be
his after tax income, and ( ) xt N −  be the total tax to be levied.  Then the system (1.14)
distributes taxes so as to equalize the net sacrifice measured along the scale u.  Concavity of u –
decreasing marginal utility – means that a dollar taken from the rich translates into a lesser
sacrifice than a dollar taken from the poor.  Hence the choice of u allows the social planner to
adjust the progressivity of taxation while following the normatively transparent principle of
equal sacrifice.
Here is a precise definition of the equal sacrifice methods.
Proposition 1.8. Fix u, a continuous and strictly increasing real valued function defined on
the nonnegative real line.  For any rationing problem (, ,) N t x  the following system has a unique
solution y, and y is a solution to the rationing problem:
 and for all  :{ 0    ( ) ( ) max { ( ) ( )} ii i i j j j
iN
y t i y ux uy ux uy
∈
=> ⇒ − = − ∑ (1.15)
This rationing method satisfies Symmetry, Ranking, Consistency and Upper Composition.
All equal sacrifice methods are clearly consistent, but, in general an equal sacrifice method
fails Lower Composition.  The only exceptions are the Proportional and Uniform Losses
methods. Moreover, an equal sacrifice method meets Ranking* (1.3) if and only if the utility
function u is concave.24




( )   yields the proportional method
( ) yields the Uniform Losses method




Interestingly, the Uniform Gains solution is not an equal sacrifice method, but it is the limit
of power methods.  Consider the family of utility functions up:
uz
z
p p p () =− < <+ ∞
1
0 where (1.16)
For p close to zero the corresponding method approaches the proportional method, whereas
for p arbitrarily large it approaches the Uniform Gains method.  Let us compute for instance the
method corresponding to u1; the system (1.14) always has a unique solution, and yields
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Next consider the family of utilities uq
uz z q qq () =< < + ∞  where 0 (1.17)
For q close to zero, the corresponding method approaches pr, for q =1 it is the method ul,
and for q arbitrary large it approaches the "hyperregressive" method that gives full priority to the
agents with the largest xi.  In the case of two agents, this method is defined as
r t x x prio t x x x x
prio t x x x x
tt
xx
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Note finally that for qu q ≤1,  is concave and the corresponding method meets Ranking*.
We state next a partial converse of proposition 1.7.  It uses three additional axioms:
Strict Monotonicity: for all   for all    Ntt x t t y y i ii ,, , : { } { } ′ < ′ ⇒< ′
Strict Ranking: for all   and all  Ntx ij x x y y ij ij ,, , : { } { } <⇒<
Scale Invariance:  for all  , ,  and  0 : ( , , ) ( , , ) Ntx rN t x rNtx αα α α ≥⋅ ⋅ = ⋅25
Strict Monotonicity and Strict Ranking are demanding properties; for instance both ug and ul
(as well as cg) fail both requirements.  They are intuitively reasonable and yet they cut a subset
of rationing methods that is not topologically closed, an unpalatable feature.
Scale Invariance, on the other hand, is an impeccable invariance axiom insisting that the
choice of the unit to measure both the demands/claims/taxable income and the available
resources, should be of no consequence whatsoever.  It is satisfied by all rationing methods
discussed so far.
Theorem 1.4. Young [1988]
i) A rationing method satisfying Consistency, Upper Composition, Strict Monotonicity and
Strict Ranking must be an equal sacrifice method, defined by system (1.14).
ii) A rationing method satisfying Consistency, Upper Composition, Strict Monotonicity, Strict
Ranking and Scale Invariance, must be an equal sacrifice method derived from a power
function , 0 p up << ∞ , ((1.16)), or must be the proportional method.
An important open question.  Replace in statement i) Strict Monotonicity and Strict Ranking
by Monotonicity and Ranking: now all equal sacrifice methods (given by (1.15)) with a concave
utility, as well as Uniform Gains, are available.  Is this all?  Similarly, if in statement ii) we
weaken the same two axioms in the same way, all methods derived from the power functions up
((1.16)) as well as ((1.17)) for  1
q uq ≤ , and ug meet these requirements.  Is this all?
Young [1990] offers an empirical “verification” of Theorem 1.4, by showing a number of
actual tax schedules that fit well within the family of equal sacrifice methods constructed from
the power functions up.
1.7. Asymmetric methods: combining the invariance axioms
When the recipients of the resources have different exogeneous rights, in addition to their
possibly different demands, the symmetry axiom must be abandoned.  In bankruptcies and
inheritances, creditors or heirs often have different status implying some priorities between their
claims, irrespective of their sizes.  For instance the federal government's claim on the assets of a
bankrupt firm has absolute priority over the claims of the trustees, who have priority over those
of the shareholders and so on.26
The most asymmetric rationing methods are the priority methods  prio() σ  ((1.8)).  In
order to define a consistent priority method we must introduce the set  N  from which the agents
can be drawn.  This set can be finite or infinite.  Recall that in the previous Part about symmetric
methods,  was any countably infinite set.  In the current Part, by contrast, we can
accommodate the case of a finite set  .
We denote by σ  an ordering (complete, transitive, antisymmetric relation) of   and for
any finite subset N of  , we also write σ  for the induced ordering on N.  Any finite set N is
ordered by σ  as N n = (,,, ) σσ σ 12   and for any rationing problem ( , , ) Ntx, we define the
allocation  prio N t x () (, ,) σ  exactly as in (1.8).  Note that the dual of  prio() σ  is the priority
method with the opposite ordering of  .
The following fact is obvious: for any orderingσ , the priority method prio (σ ) meets
Consistency, Upper and Lower Composition, and Scale Invariance.
Thus our four powerful invariance axioms are met by the three basic symmetric methods pr,
ug and ul as well as by the most asymmetric ones, the priority methods.  Theorem 1.5 below
describes the relatively simple family of methods satisfying all four axioms: they "connect" the
three symmetric methods to the priority ones in interesting ways.
We define the composition of rationing methods.  Given are   and a partition  α =∪ 
where the parameter α  varies in  .  For every α  we are also given a rationing method on  α 
denoted r
α ; moreover ~ r  is a rationing method on  .  The composition of these methods is
denoted [, rr
α α ∈   ] r = .  For any problem ( , , ) Ntx, with a finite society N, N ⊆  , we define
NN α =∩α   and A is the finite subset of   containing α  if and only if Nα  is nonempty.
The shares  yr N t x = ( , , ) are computed in two steps: first we split t among the subsets Nα  (i.e.,
among the “agents” of A) according to ~ r , then the share zα  allocated to Nα  is divided among
the agents in Nα  according to r
α :
zr A t x A y r N z x i N Ni i N αα
α
αα α βα α =∈ = ∈ ~ (, , ( ) ) ; ( , ) []  for   for 
Thus, the operation of composition generates “two tiered” rationing methods that may apply
different equity principles for the aggregate problem (on  ) and for any of the decentralized27
problems (on Nα ).  Note that the Decentralization property (Section 1.2) says precisely that a
certain method is preserved by “self-composition”.
We say that the composition operation respects property Q if, whenever all methods
,, rr α α ∈   , meet Q, so does the method  [ , rr α α ∈   ].
Proposition 1.9.
i) The composition of rationing methods respects the following properties: Resource
Monotonicity, Upper and Lower Composition, and Scale Invariance.
ii) The composition operation does not respect the Consistency property, or Equal Treatment
of Equals.
iii) If each method , r
α α ∈ , is consistent, and σ  is an ordering of  , the composition
() [, prio r
α σα ∈ ] is consistent as well.
Proposition 1.9 shows that the three invariance axioms UC, LC and SI, are met by a rich
family of rationing methods, obtained by composing such methods as pr, ug, ul (as well as their
asymmetric versions  gw  and lw, to be defined shortly) in an arbitrary number of tiers.  There
are many more methods in this family, as discussed in Moulin and Shenker [1999].
When we impose CSY as well, the set of available methods becomes much simpler, although
it still allows a great deal of flexibility.  The following asymmetric versions of ug and ul play a
key role in the characterization result.
For any set of positive weights wi, one for eachi∈ , we define the weighted gains method
gw  as follows:
for all   where   solves  min{
N
Nt xy g Nt x wx wx t ii
w
ii ii ,, : ( ,, ) m i n { , } , } == = ∑ λλ λ
Its dual method is the weighted losses method lw:




,, : ( ,, ) m a x { ,} m a x { ,} == − − = ∑ µ µ µ 00
The Uniform Gains and Uniform Losses methods are the two particular methods
corresponding to uniform weights ( ) wi i =1 for all  .  Note that when the weights of the different
agents are very unequal, the methods  gw  and lw become arbitrarily close to any priority28
method: it will be enough to guarantee that if agent i is higher than agent j in the priority
ordering, his weight becomes infinitely bigger than agent j's weight.
Clearly, the methods  gw  and lw meet all four invariance axioms CSY, UC, LC and SI.  In
view of Proposition 1.9, we can construct many rationing methods meeting the four invariance
axioms as follows.  Partition arbitrarily the set   in “priority classes” and order these classes.
In each priority class, use either the proportional, or a weighted gains, or a weighted losses
method.  An example is provided by the American bankruptcy law, which arranges the creditors
in priority classes and uses the proportional method within each class (Kaminski [2000]).
In order to state the last theorem in this Part, we need two more definitions.  We say that the
rationing method r gives priority to agent i over agent j if j does not get anything unless i's
demand is met in full:  yy x ji i >⇒ = 0  (for all Ntx , , ).  We say that a rationing method is
irreducible if for any pair ij , , r does not give priority to i over j.  For instance pr,  gl ww  and 
(for any w) are all irreducible (recall that we require positive weights wi).
Theorem 1.5. (Moulin [2000])
i) Let r be a rationing method meeting Consistency, Upper and Lower Composition and
Scale Invariance.  Then there is a partition  =∪ α  , an ordering σ  of  , and for each α
an irreducible method r
α  meeting CSY, UC, LC and SI such that:
() [, rp r i o r
α σα =∈  ]
ii) Let r be an irreducible method meeting Consistency, Upper and Lower Composition and
Scale Invariance.  If   contains at least three agents, then r is either the proportional method,
or a weighted gains method, or a weighted losses method.
In Moulin [2000], the somewhat involved family of irreducible methods for the case   2 =
is described in full.
Within the family uncovered in Theorem 1.5, our three basic rationing methods are the only
symmetric methods (except in the case   2 = ).
Corollary to Theorem 1.5. Assume   contains at least three agents.  Then there are
exactly three rationing methods satisfying Equal Treatment of Equals and the four invariance
axioms: they are the Proportional, Uniform Gains and Uniform Losses methods.29
A much needed next step in the theory of rationing methods is an asymmetric version of
Theorem 1.3: what is the set of methods consistent and continuous? Naumova [2000] offers an
asymmetric generalization of Theorem 1.4, where the utility functions measuring sacrifice are
personalized.
Another interesting open question (discussed in Moulin [2000]) is to generalize Theorem 1.5
(or its Corollary) by dropping one of the four invariance axioms. For instance a method meeting
Consistency, Scale Invariance and Upper Composition is priority to higher demands: given the
profile of demands x, this method gives priority to i over j if and only if  xx ij > , and treats equal
demands equally (thus it is symmetric as well); it emerged in Section 1.5 as the limit as some
equal sacrifice methods (see the discussion of power methods (1.17)).  Its dual method, priority
to lower demands, meets all four axioms in Theorem 1.5 except Upper Composition.  The
characterization of all rationing methods meeting Consistency, Scale Invariance and one of the
composition axioms is wide open.
1.8. Fixed path methods
This important family of rationing methods contains asymmetric variants of the uniform
gains method as well as the priority methods. The fixed path methods play an important role in
Part 3 when we discuss Demand Monotonicity (Sections 3.4 and 3.6). They emerge also in the
model of fair division under single-peaked preferences (briefly discussed in Section 1.10), where
they are a key example of strategy-proof methods. In this Section we merely define these
methods and check their invariance properties.
It is necessary to place an exogeneous bound on individual demands.  This bound may be
finite or infinite.  We call it the capacity of agent i and write  Xi where  Xi ≤+ ∞ (real or
infinite).  A rationing problem ( , , ) Ntx must now satisfy 0 ≤≤ xX ii  for all i.  We always
assume that xi is finite for all i.
A fixed path method is defined from a family of monotone paths γ () N , one for each possible
society N.  The path γ () N  is a nondecreasing mapping from [ , ] 0 XN  into [, ] [] 0 X N  such that
 for all  ,  for all 
 for all 












:( , ) ,( , )
lim ( , )
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γ30
Note that γ  must be continuous in t.  If  Xi is finite for all i, the limit property holds true
because γ (, ) [] NX X NN = .
The fixed path method r
γ  is now defined as follows:
i
N
( , , ) min{ ( , ), } for all  , where   is a solution of  min{ ( , ), } ii i ii rN t x N sx i s N sx t
γ γγ == ∑  (1.19)
If we take xX =  (xX N = [] ) in the above equation, we find
γ
γ (, ) (, ,) Nt r NtX = (1.20)
Examples of fixed path methods include the uniform gains method (for the path ug N t X (, ,) )
any weighted gains method, and any priority method  prio() σ .  Note that a priority method can
be represented as a fixed path method only if all capacities  Xi  are finite (with the possible
exception of the capacity of the last agent in the priority ordering).  The path tp r i o N t X → (, ,)
follows the edges of the cube [ , ] 0 X  in the order specified by σ .
If  XX ij =  for all ij , , uniform gains is a symmetric fixed path method.  It is the only fixed
path method meeting Equal Treatment of Equals: indeed the path rNtX ( , , ) must be diagonal by
ETE, so the claim follows from (1.20) and (1.19).
The set of fixed path methods is not stable by duality: for instance uniform losses is not
such a method.  It contains no self-dual method.
Proposition 1.10.
i) All fixed path methods meet Upper Composition.  They generally fail Lower Composition.
ii) A fixed path method is consistent if and only if the associated paths NN →γ ()  commute
with the projection operator:
()
[] [] for all  , , : ( ) namely  ( , ) ( , ( , )) for all 
N
S SS NSS N S Nt S Nt t γγ γ γ γ ⊆= = (1.21)
Note that all the methods obtained by a priority composition of weighted gains methods (see
Proposition 1.9) are fixed path methods and satisfy Lower Composition.  I conjecture that there
is no other fixed path method meeting LC.
The property (1.21) in statement ii) is especially easy to read when the maximal set   of
potential agents is finite.  The single path  ( γ  ) from 0 to  X  generates the entire family of
paths γ () N  by simple projection on N.  In this case we can really speak of a one path method.31
1.9. Rationing indivisible goods
We modify the rationing model assuming that the commodity being distributed comes in
indivisible units.  Examples include cars, appliances, seats for a concert or in a plane, organs for
transplant, etc.
The formal model is identical, except that all the variables tx y ii , ,  are nonnegative integers.
The definitions of a rationing problem, a solution, and a rationing method are unchanged.  The
set of such methods is denoted    .  The duality operation is unchanged.
It is convenient to think of a rationing method as a scheduling algorithm.  Fix N and x and
restrict attention to resource monotonic rationing methods.  The path tr N t x → (, ,)  is described
as a sequence { , , } ii K 1   in NK x i N , where   and  = 1 is the agent receiving the first unit
(( ,, ) rN x 1  gives the unit to i1), i2 is the agent receiving the second unit and so on.  In the
sequence { , , } ii K 1  , agent i appears exactly xi times, for all i.
The definitions of Consistency, Upper and Lower Composition, are all unchanged.  Note that
Consistency has a particularly simple formulation in terms of the sequence { , , } ii k 1   describing
the path tr N t x → (, ,) .  The axiom says that by simply dropping all occurrences of a certain
agent i in this sequence, we obtain the sequence describing the path tr N i t x Ni → (\ , , ) [\ ].
Symmetry is lost when we allocate indivisible goods, as long as the allocation is
deterministic. If we now think of the division of resources as a random variable, we can restore
this basic equity property, at least in the ex ante sense. It turns out that the probabilistic rationing
of indivisible goods arise naturally in the discussion of additive cost sharing methods in Part 3 –
an entirely deterministic model –.
A probabilistic rationing method associates to every deterministic rationing model
(, , )   Ntx (where   and i tx are integers) a random variable Y  such that, with probability one,
0 ii Yx ≤≤ for all i and  N Yt = . The three basic methods pr, ug and ul have a canonical
probabilistic analog.
To define the proportional method, fix the profile of claims  i x  and throw  i x  balls of color i
in an urn, for each iN ∈ ; drawing from the urn t times, independently and without replacement
– and with uniform probability – generates the random variable  ( , , ) Yr N t x =  of the random
proportional method. Clearly, the expected value of  i Y  is agent i’s proportional share  .( / ) iN tx x .32
The random proportional method meets Consistency, Upper and Lower Composition, as well
as Equal Treatment of Equals (ex ante). Conversely, the method is characterized by ETE, UC
and LC: Moulin [1999b].
The probabilistic analog of uniform gains is called Fair Queuing (Shenker [1995], Demers et
al. [1990]). Given a profile of claims  i x , this method gives away one unit to each agent in round
robin fashion, selecting randomly and with uniform probability the ordering in which they
receive each unit; an agent drops out only when his claim is not met in full. The expected value
of agent i’s share after t units have been distributed is exactly his uniform gains share in the
deterministic problem ( , , ) Ntx.
The Fair Queuing method meets Consistency and Upper Composition, but fails Lower
Composition. Moulin and Stong [2000] show that this method is characterized by the
combination of CSY, UC, and a strong form of Equal Treatment of Equals: two agents with
identical claims have equal expected shares, and their actual (ex post) shares never differ by
more than one unit.
The dual method, Fair Queuing* allocates each unit with equal probability among the agents
with the highest remaining claim, i.e., their initial claim net of the units received in earlier
rounds.
The characterization results in the probabilistic model of rationing are generally sharper than
in the classical model. Moulin and Stong [2000] provide very complete descriptions of the set of
methods meeting UC and LC, or CSY and UC (or CSY and LC).
1.10. Two variants of the rationing model
a) Surplus sharing
In a surplus sharing problem (, ,) Ntx, the resources t must be divided according to the
profile of claims x and we assume tx N ≥ : the resources exceed the sum of individual claims.
One interpretation is that xi is the amount of investment contributed by agent i to a joint venture,
and t is the total return, allowing a profit tx N − .  Alternatively, the resources being distributed
are undesirable (a tax, a workload) and agent i's claim xi entitles him to receive no more than a
share xi of the total liability.  These claims are not compatible.33
A solution y to the surplus sharing problem allocates a share  yi to agent i in such a way that
0 ≤≤ xy ii  and  yt N = .  A surplus sharing method d associates a solution  yd N t x = (, ,)  t o
every surplus sharing problem ( , , ) Ntx.
The Proportional surplus sharing method is given by the same formula as in the rationing
case. Uniform Gains is defined as follows:
N
( , , ) max { , }   where   is the solution of  max { , } ii i i yu g N t x x x t λλ λ == = ∑
The counterpart of the Uniform Losses rationing method simply divides the surplus equally,
and for this reason we call it the egalitarian method:
1
(, , ) ( ) ii i N ye g N t xx t x
n
== + −
In the surplus sharing model there is no duality operation, hence no analog to the Contested
Garment method.
Consistency and Scale Invariance have the same definition but there is only one Composition
axiom:
for all Ntt x x t t dNtx dNtdNt x N , ,, : (, ,) (, ,(,,) ) ′ ≤ ′ ≤⇒ = ′ (1.22)
Several axiomatic results about rationing have a direct counterpart in the surplus sharing
model, and several new results emerge as well. For instance, the proportional method is
characterized, as in Theorem 1.1, by Independence of Merging (or Splitting), or by
Decomposition. On the other hand, many surplus sharing methods meet No Advantageous
Reallocation, including the egalitarian method.
Theorems 1.3 about parametric methods and Theorems 1.4 about equal sacrifice methods are
readily adapted to the surplus sharing context: Young [1987], Moulin [1987].
The following result is the counterpart of Theorem 1.5 and its Corollary. The asymmetric
generalizations of the egalitarian method divide the surplus in proportion to a set of fixed shares
,0 ii ww≥  for all i and  1 N w = :
( , , ) .( )
w
ii i i N yr N t xxw t x == + −
The proportional method and the fixed share method 
w r meet No Advantageous Reallocation,
Consistency, Composition and Scale Invariance. Conversely, these four axioms characterize this
family of surplus sharing methods. If we add Equal Treatment of Equals to the list of
requirements, only the Proportional and the Egalitarian methods are left. See Moulin [1987].34
b) Fair division with single-peaked preferences
Think of a context where the size of agent i's claim/demand xi is private information, so that
agent i may choose to misrepresent its actual value if this proves beneficial.  We make the
following assumption on individual preferences over shares: given that his (real) claim/demand
is xi, agent i strictly prefers  yy ii  to  ′ if  ′ <≤ yyx iii  but strictly prefers  ′ ≤ ′ < yyxyy ii iii  to   if  .
This is the familiar assumption of singlepeakedness.  It is a realistic assumption in the rationing
problem if the resources being distributed are not freely disposable: think of food that must be
eaten in one day, or of a share in a risky venture.  For examples and discussion of this
assumption see Sprumont [1991] or Barbera, Jackson and Neme [1997].
A fair division method works as follows in this context. The mechanism elicits the peaks of
individual preferences (corresponding to the claims xi in the rationing or surplus sharing
models) and each peak xi can be anywhere in the fixed interval [, ] 0 Xi .  For a given amount of
resources t, the sum of individual claims xN  may be smaller or larger than t.  Thus the allocation
problem may be a rationing problem or a surplus sharing problem and an allocation method is a
pair of one rationing and one surplus sharing method.
Incentive compatibility of this mechanism is the strategy-proofness property: reporting one’s
true peak is optimal for every agent, irrespective of other agents’ reports.
The key observation is that Uniform Gains (used both for the rationing and the surplus
sharing cases) is a strategy-proof method, and so are all the fixed paths methods, where a
different path can be used for the rationing and for the surplus sharing cases. Conversely,
Uniform Gains is characterized by Strategy-proofness, Efficiency and Equal Treatment of
Equals: Sprumont [1991], see also Ching [1994]. Similarly, the consistent fixed path methods are
characterized by Strategy-proofness, Efficiency, Consistency and Resource Monotonicity:
Moulin [1999a], see also Barbera, Jackson and Neme [1997].
There is also a sizable literature looking at the fair division problem with singlepeaked
preferences from an equity angle, and where axioms such as No Envy or Population
Monotonicity play a big role: see Thomson [1994a, b], [1995], [1997], Schummer and Thomson
[1997] and references there.  Once again Uniform Gains stands out as the method of choice.35
2. Sharing variable returns
2.1. The problem and some examples
A (one-dimensional) cost sharing problem is a triple (,,) NCx where N is a finite set of
agents, C is a continuous nondecreasing cost function from R+ into R+ such that C() 00 = , and
xx iiN = ∈ ( )  specifies for each agent i a demand x x ii , ≥ 0.
A solution to the cost sharing problem ( , , ) NCx is a vector  yy iiN = ∈ ( )  specifying a cost
share for every agent and such that




∑ ∑ 0 for all  , ; ( ) (2.1)
A surplus sharing problem is the same mathematical object as a cost sharing problem but its
interpretation is different: the given function is denoted F (to avoid confusion) and is now a
production function; if total input contribution is z, total output is Fz ( ); next xi is agent i's input
contribution and  yi is agent i's share of the total output Fx N ( ).  The whole axiomatic discussion
is unaffected by the choice of one or the other context, although certain axioms are not equally
natural in both contexts. With the exception of a few examples, we use the cost sharing
interpretation and terminology throughout Parts 2 and 3.
A cost sharing method (resp. a surplus sharing method) is a mapping ϕ  associating to any
cost sharing (resp. surplus sharing) problem a solution  yN C x =ϕ( , , ).  We denote by   the set
of cost sharing methods thus defined.
Note that variable population axioms play no role in this Section (see comment b) in Section
2.5).  Therefore, omit N in the variables of ϕ : we write  yC x =ϕ(,) .
The question addressed in this Section is the equitable division of cost (or surplus) shares
when the returns of the technology vary.  In other words our initial postulate is that constant
returns pose no equity issue whatsoever: costs (or surplus) shares must simply be proportional to
individual demands of output (resp. contributions of input).  This corresponds to the following
axiom on the cost sharing method ϕ .
Constant Returns
{() . } {( ,,) .} , , Cz z z NCx x N C x =≥ ⇒= ≥ λ ϕ λλ  for all   for all   all   all   all  0 0 (2.2)36
A simple example of a cost sharing problem with increasing returns (decreasing average
cost) is discount pricing.  The agents in N are grouping their order of wine (there is only one
quality of wine).  Wine can be bought at the local store at price  p1 or at a lower price  p2 from a
discount retailer located far away.  In the latter case a fixed transportation cost c0 (independent
of the shipment size) must be added.  Hence the cost function:
Cz p zc p z () m i n { , } =⋅ + ⋅ 10 2 (2.3)
If the total demand xN  justifies buying from the discount retailer (if  xcp p N >− 012 /( ))
how should total cost be split among the buyers?  With several suppliers, the cost function C
takes the form of a concave, increasing and piecewise linear function starting at C() 00 = .
Our second example is a cost sharing problem with decreasing returns (increasing average
cost).  Think of N as encompassing all the consumers of a certain good (N is a monopsonist for
this good) competitively supplied.  Thus the demand z is met at price Sz
−1( ), where the supply
function  pS p → ( ) is increasing; the resulting cost function Cz zS z () () =⋅
−1  has decreasing
returns.
In the surplus sharing context, we find symmetrical examples displaying increasing or
decreasing returns technologies.  For instance, the agent in N may be monopolizing the supply of
a certain good for which the demand is competitive.  The market absorbs z units of output at
price Dz ( ) where D is decreasing; hence the revenue function Fz zDz () () =⋅  has decreasing
returns.
A simple example with increasing returns involves fixed costs (as in example (2.3)).  The
agents can use a technology with constant returns r 1 and no fixed input cost, or they can pay a
fixed input cost c0 and benefit from higher returns r2 :
Fz r z r z c ( ) max{ , ( )} =⋅ ⋅ − 12 0 (2.4)
A brief overview of Part 2 follows.  In Section 2.2, the average cost sharing method is
characterized in precisely the same way as proportional rationing in Section 1.2.  Serial cost
sharing is introduced in Section 2.3: together with average cost sharing, it plays the key role in
the current model.  In Section 2.4 the property of Additivity (of cost shares with respect to the
addition of cost functions) is defined and the main theorem derived: the set of rationing methods
is isomorphic to that of additive cost sharing methods; in particular serial cost sharing37
corresponds to the uniform gains rationing method.  Some variants and open questions are
gathered in Section 2.5.
2.2. Average cost method
The simplest cost sharing method divides total cost in proportion to individual demands.  It is
denoted ac:








(of course, if xN = 0 we must have  y = 0).  The average cost method entirely ignores the
returns of the technology between 0 and the total demand xN .  From all the methods discussed
in this Section, it is the most informationally economical.  This is convenient from an
implementation viewpoint, but has no normative appeal per se.
A first type of axiomatic justification for this method mimics those of the proportional
rationing method in Section 1.2.  The axioms of No Advantageous Reallocations ( ) NAR ,
Irrelevance of Reallocations (IR), and Independence of Merging and Splitting (IMS) are
transported word for word from that context to that of cost sharing methods by simply replacing
the resources t in rationing by the cost function C.  Theorem 1.1 has the following counterpart.
Theorem 2.1.  Assume N contains three agents or more.  The average cost method meets the
three properties NAR, IR and IMS, as well as the following property:
No Charge for Null Demand
{} { ( , , ) } , xy N C x C x i ii i =⇒ = = 00 ϕ   for all   and all  (2.6)
Conversely, the average cost method is the only cost sharing method charging nothing for a
null demand and meeting any one of NAR, IR or IMS.
The interpretation of (2.6) in the case of cost sharing is that no one should have to pay
anything for no output; in the case of output sharing, it is sometime referred to as “No Free
Lunch”: you don't receive any output if you did not participate in the production process by
contributing some money or some labor.  All methods discussed in Sections 2.2 to 2.4 satisfy
(2.6).  In Section 2.5 we give some arguments against this axiom and offer a method that violates
it.38
The interpretation of the three axioms NAR, IR and IMS is the same as in the case of
rationing: one does not need to monitor the "identity" of the various units of demands (whether a
certain unit comes from an agent with a large or small demand is irrelevant).  Any unit of
demand is treated anonymously and therefore there is no benefit in passing them around.
2.3. Serial cost sharing
The average cost (average returns) method entirely ignores the variation of the returns
between 0 and xN .  When those returns vary widely and when individual demands are of very
different size as well, this result in an unpalatable distribution of costs (or output).  Consider the
(decreasing returns) cost function
Cz z a a () ( ) () m a x {,} =− = ++ 10 0  where, as usual,  (2.7)
The first 10 units are free, and additional demands cost 1 per unit.  Say N ={, ,} 123  and




Is it fair that agent 1 pays anything, when he could argue that his fair share of the 10 free units is
3 1
3  and that he is not consuming that much?  The point is that agent 1 is charged the high
average cost that he did not cause in the first place: as Cx () 30 1 = , if no one else asks more than
he does, no one has to pay; hence he should not be held responsible for costs that only arise
because other agents demand more than he does.
Notice that, viewed in the light of output sharing, the argument is less convincing: here
Fz z () ( ) =− + 10  is a production function requiring a fixed cost of 10 before output can be
collected (a particular example of (2.4)).  Agent 1's contribution of 3 units of input is useful,
even if applied to pay the fixed cost; other agents should give him some share of the output.




() m i n {, } =+ 9
10
(2.8)
with x = (,,) 357 .  Average cost yields  y = (. ,.,.) 21 35 49  so agent 1 ends up paying less than his
Stand Alone cost Cx () 1 3 = .  Note that the first 10 units cost 1 apiece, and that the price drops to
.1 for each additional unit.  This time, agents 2 and 3 protest that they were the ones responsible39
for reaching the low marginal cost, because 3 10 1 x < , so agent 1 should not get any benefit from
that; his fair share of the cost is 3 because the returns are constant up to the level 3 1 x .
Notice that the argument is even stronger in the output sharing context.  The production
function has a high return of 3 up to 10 units of input, after which the return drops to  1
10.  Agent
1 is entitled to a fair share of the “good returns”: as his “demand” falls below this fair share 10/3,
he should receive 9 units of output, a far cry from what the average returns method offers him.
The above discussion suggests the following upper and lower bounds on cost shares,
depending on the variation of marginal costs/returns.  The set N is fixed and #( ) Nn = .
Increasing marginal costs bounds (IMC bounds)




i :( ) ( , )
()
, ≤= ≤ ϕ (2.9)
Decreasing marginal cost bounds (DMC bounds)
if   is concave:  for all   all  C
Cn x
n
yC x C x i x i
ii i
()
(,) () , ≤= ≤ ϕ (2.10)
We let the reader check that each one of the announced bounds is compatible with budget
balance in the corresponding domain of cost functions.  For instance a convex cost function such
that C() 00 =  is subadditive hence the left-hand inequality in the IMC bound is feasible.  And so
on.
Consider a convex cost function.  The Stand Alone lower bound  yC x ii ≥ ( ) says simply that
no agent can benefit from the presence of other users of the technology.  This is compelling
when marginal costs increase because the consumption of any user creates a negative externality
on that of any other user.  Indeed, most cost sharing methods discussed in Part 2 meet the Stand
Alone lower bound when C is convex, and the Stand Alone upper bound when C is concave
(case where any user creates a positive externality on any other user).  This is true for all additive
methods: Corollary 1 to Theorem 2.1.
By contrast, the two remaining inequalities in (2.9) (2.10) fail for the average cost method, as
shown by the numerical examples above.
Consider again a convex cost function and the Unanimity Upper Bound  y C nx n ii ≤ () / .
This says that an agent's cost share cannot exceed her share when all agents demand the same
amount as she does (and are treated equally).  Given that marginal costs increase, this conveys
the idea that agent i is entitled to a fair share of the “good” marginal costs, namely those of the40
first nxi units.  Think of the scheduling example: we are saying that all agents have an equal
right to the best (i.e., the earliest) slots in the queue.  If xi is much smaller than the other
demands, this bound has a lot of bite.
A symmetrical interpretation holds for the Unanimity Lower Bound ( ( )/ y C nx n ii ≥ ) when
C is concave: in the output sharing context, it says that agent i is entitled to a fair share of the
good marginal returns; in the cost sharing context, that she should accept her fair share of
responsibility for the “bad” marginal cost.  See Moulin [1992] for a general discussion of the
notion of unanimity bounds.
The serial cost sharing formula (Shenker [1995], Moulin and Shenker [1992]) is directly
inspired by the unanimity bounds.  Fix C and a profile of demands x.  We start by relabeling the
agents by increasing demands: xx x n 12 ≤≤ ≤  .  First we split equally the cost of the first nx1
units among all agents.  Now agent 1 is served (and pays Cn x n () / 1 ) and we split equally the
cost of additional units between the remaining agents { , , , } 23 n , until agent 2 is served, and so
on.  Formally we define a sequence xi n i,, , =1  as follows:
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In the cases nn == 23  and   the general formulas (2.12), (2.13) are simple:
12 1 12 12 1
123 1 12 1 2 1
31 2 1
11
2, : (2 ) ; ( ) (2 )
22
111
3; : (3 ); ( 2 ) (3 );
32 6
11
() ( 2 ) ( 3 )
26
N
nx x yC x y C x x C x
nx x x yC x yC x xC x
yC x C x x C x
=≤ = =+ −
=≤ ≤ = = + −
=−+ −
For instance, in the numerical examples discussed above:41
{() ( ), (,,) } (,. ,.)
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Recall from the discussion after (2.7), that the serial cost share  1 0 y =  is plausible in the cost
sharing interpretation, less so in a surplus sharing story. Similarly in the case of the cost function
(2.8), the serial cost share  1 3 y =  denies any cost saving to agent 1, despite the fact that his
presence increases the cost savings of the other two agents: this is clearly an extreme
interpretation of fairness in this example.
In the examples, the agent with the smallest demand prefers his serial cost share to his
average cost share in the example with increasing marginal cost and his preferences are reversed
in the example with decreasing marginal cost.  The preferences of the agent with the largest
demand are diametrically opposed.  This is a general fact.
Kolpin [1998] proposes further interpretations of the serial formula in terms of linear pricing.
We conclude Section 2.3 by generalizing the decentralized bounds (2.9), (2.10) for the serial
cost shares to a cost function with arbitrary returns.  That is, we give an upper and a lower bound
on  yC x ii =ϕ ( , ) that only depend upon C, xi and n, the number of users.  This is important for
an uninformed agent, who cannot assess the size of other agents' demands.
Proposition 2.1. The serial cost sharing method meets the Increasing Marginal Costs bounds
((2.9)) and the Decreasing Marginal Costs bounds ((2.10)).  Moreover, for any non decreasing
cost function C (such that C() 00 = ), it satisfies the following Universal Bounds:
1
n
Cx y Cx Cn x ii i i () (, ) ( ) ≤= ≤ ϕ (2.14)
It is easy to check that the average cost method fails both universal bounds.  Take the cost
function (2.7) and x = (,, ) 3 5 7 : the upper bound is violated for agent 1.  Take the cost function
(2.8) and x(, , ) 3 20 27 : the lower bound is violated for agent 1.
The universal bounds are deceptively mild: they eliminate many appealing cost sharing
methods.  Among the additive methods analyzed in Section 2.4, the universal lower bound is met
by many methods besides serial cost sharing.  For instance the Shapley-Shubik cost sharing
method (see Section 2.4) meets this bound, and so does any convex combination of serial and
Shapley-Shubik.  On the other hand the universal upper bound essentially characterizes serial
cost sharing: Theorem 2.3 below.42
2.4. Additive cost sharing
In the rationing problem, the requirement that the solution y depends linearly upon the
resources t is enough to single out the proportional rationing method: Chun [1988].  By contrast,
in the cost sharing problem with homogeneous goods, there is a rich family of cost sharing
methods where the solution  yC x =ϕ( , ) depends additively upon the function C.  Theorem 2.2
below establishes a linear isomorphism between this family and the set of (resource monotonic)
rationing methods.  Thus Additivity leaves a lot of maneuvering room to the mechanism
designer.
With a slight abuse of notation we denote by   the set of monotonic rationing methods
(note that all rationing methods discussed in Part 1 are monotonic). An element r of   defines
for all 
N x + ∈R  a monotonic (hence continuous) path  ( , ) tr t x → from 0 to x:
0 ( , ) ,  ( , )   for all  ,0 NN rtx x r tx t t t x ≤≤ = ≤ ≤
' ( , ) ( ', )  for all  , ',0 ' N tt r t x r t x t t t x ≤⇒ ≤ ≤≤
The domain   of cost functions consists of all the functions C that can be written as the
difference of two convex functions: this domain contains all the twice continuously differentiable
functions, as well as all the piecewise linear functions. Naturally, we also require each function C
in   to be non decreasing and such that  (0) 0 C = .
We denote by   the set of cost sharing methods: an element ϕ  of   associates a solution
(,) Cx ϕ  to every cost sharing problem ( , ) Cx where C∈  and 
N x + ∈R . In addition to Constant
Returns (2.2), we consider the following powerful axiom:
() Additivity ADD
12 1 2 1 2 ( ; ) ( ; ) ( ; )   for all  ,  all  CC x C x C x C C x ϕϕ ϕ += + ∈  (2.15)
This property allows to decompose the computation of cost shares whenever the cost
function itself can be additively decomposed. This commutativity brings a sharp representation
result: the additive cost sharing methods are isomorphic to rationing methods.
We denote by  t Γ  the cost function  ( ) min{ , } t zz t Γ=  (easier to interpret as a production
function: returns are one until the level t, then drop to zero). Finally we denote by
 ( , ,...) PQ the subset of cost sharing methods meeting the properties  , ,... PQ43
Theorem 2.2. (Moulin and Shenker [1994]). Consider the following two mappings, from
 into   (CR,ADD) and from   (CR,ADD) into  :
0 :   ( , ) '( ) ( , ) for all  ,all   
N x
rC x C t d r t x C x ϕϕ →= ∈ ∫   (2.16)
:    ( , ) ( , )  for all  , t rr t x x t x ϕϕ →= Γ (2.17)
These two mappings define a linear isomorphism from  into   (CR,ADD) and back.
Corollary to Theorem 2.2. All cost sharing methods in   (CR, ADD) meet the following
properties:
i)  No charge for null demand:  00 ii xy =⇒ =
ii)  Stand Alone lower (upper) bound under increasing (decreasing) marginal costs:
 convex ( ) for all  , , all  SS Cy C x C x S N ⇒≥ ⊆
 concave ( ) for all  , ,all  SS Cy C x C x S N ⇒≤ ⊆
Theorem 2.2 establishes a precise isomorphism between monotonic rationing methods and
additive cost sharing methods. In particular, the key methods on both sides are matched, and
many of the normative requirements in one model have a counterpart in the other one. Below is a
list of rationing methods and cost sharing methods matched by the linear isomorphism.
a)  proportional rationing ↔average cost sharing
In  , the proportional method gives to every dollar of claim the same right to the resources t
; similarly in  , average cost sharing gives to every unit of demand the same responsibility in
total cost (every unit of input is entitled to the same output share).
b)  uniform gains rationing ↔serial cost sharing
Fix N and x, and label the agent so that  12 ... n xx x ≤≤ ≤. Agent i’s share  ( , ) ii yu g t x =  where
t varies in [0, ] N x is easily computed, with the help of the sequence 
i x  given by (2.11):
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Therefore the cost sharing method associated with uniform gains by (2.16) is precisely given
by (2.12), as claimed.
In   the uniform gains method gives an equal claim to all agents on the first units of
resources until their claim is met. Similarly, serial cost sharing makes all individual demands pay
an equal share of the first units produced until their demand is met.
c)  priority rationing ↔incremental cost sharing
To an ordering σ of the agents in N− a mapping from {1,...., } n into N− we associate the
following incremental cost sharing method:
11 21 2 1
1
11




yC xyC xx C x yC x Cx σσ σσ σ σ σ σ σ
−
==
== + − = − ∑∑ (2.18)
It corresponds to the priority rationing method  ( ) prio σ  (see formula (1.8)).
d)  random priority ordering ↔Shapley-Shubik cost sharing
The averaging operation is preserved by the linear isomorphism, therefore the Random
Priority rationing method ((1.9)) is associated with the arithmetic average of all incremental cost
sharing methods. This method, originally proposed by Shubik [1962], distributes costs according
to the Shapley value of the Stand Alone cost game:
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{ ( ) ( ) ( )}  where { , } {1,2}
2
ii j y Cx x Cx Cx ij =+ + − = (2.20)
The Shapley-Shubik method plays an important role in the model with heterogeneous goods
(Part 3); its characterization there (Corollary 1 to Theorem 3.4) is quite convincing. Contrast this
with the lack of normative arguments in favor of Random Priority rationing, or in favor of the
Shapley-Shubik method in the current model with one homogeneous good.
The isomorphism in Theorem 2.2 also suggests new cost sharing methods corresponding to
simple rationing methods. For instance Uniform Losses gives rise to a “dual” serial method,45
where all users pay an equal share of the last units produced (instead of the first units, in the case
of serial cost sharing) until the smallest demand is satisfied, after which the remaining users
share equally the cost of the next highest units, and so on. In the case of two agents with  12 xx ≤ ,
this gives the following cost shares:
11 2 2 1 21 2 2 1
11
( ( ) ( ));   ( ( ) ( ))
22
yC x x C x x yC x x C x x =+ − − =+ − −
The Talmudic rationing method (1.10) leads to a somewhat exotic method, except in the case
of two agents, where it coincides with the Shapley-Shubik method. For  3  n = and  123 xxx ≤≤,




() () ( )
33 2 3 2
xx
yC x x x C x x C =+ + −+ − +
11 1 1
2 123 23 2 3
111 3 1 1
() () ( ) ( ) ( )
36 2 6 2 2 2 2 2
xx x x
yC x x x C x x C C x C x =+ + −+ − − ++ −+
11 1 1
31 2 3 2 3 2 3
111 3 1 1
() () ( ) ( ) ( )
36 2 6 2 2 2 2 2
xx x x
yC x x x C x x C C x C x =+ + ++ − − −+ ++
We conclude this subSection by a characterization of serial cost sharing within the set
 (, ) CR ADD . All methods in this set meet the Stand Alone bounds when the cost function is
either convex or concave (Corollary to Theorem 2.2), but they typically fail the Universal
Bounds (2.14). The Shapley-Shubik method meets the lower bound (because in the sum (2.19)
the term with S =∅ has weight 1/n) but fails the upper bound (even for  2 n = ).
The universal upper bound is a key ingredient in the characterization of the serial method; yet
it is not sufficient to single out this method in (, ) CR ADD .
Consider the counterpart of zero-consistency for rationing methods (property (1.6)):
[] [] \\ { 0} { ( , , ) 0 and  ( , , ) ( \ , , )} for all  , , ,  ii Ni Ni x NCx NCx N iCx NCxi ϕϕ ϕ =⇒ = = (2.21)
Within  (, ) CR ADD  this property is isomorphic to the axiom (1.6). It is a very mild
requirement, met by all cost sharing methods discussed in Part 2 (with the exception of some
methods allowing for negative cost shares: see Section 2.5, point a).
In order to pin down the serial method, we strengthen Zero Consistency by allowing the
removal of a non paying agent, provided we make sure to serve his demand (that could be strictly
positive). Given a method in , the property is stated as follows:46
[\ ] [\ ] {(,,) 0 } {(,,) ( \ ,, ) iN i N i NCx NCx N iCx ϕϕ ϕ =⇒ = 
where  ( ) ( )}  for all  , ,  and  i Cz Cz x NCx i =+  (2.22)
(Note that C   will have a jump at 0 if  ( ) i Cx  is positive; but the universal lower bound
guarantees ( ) 0) i Cx = .
The last ingredient is the unobjectionable equity requirement called Ranking:
ij ij xx yy ≤⇒≤. Note that the Ranking axiom (1.2) for rationing methods conveys the same
idea (is even written in the same way) but is not equivalent via the linear isomorphism. If the
rationing method r meets Ranking, the corresponding cost sharing method may not do so.
Theorem 2.3. (Moulin and Shenker [1994])
Serial cost sharing is characterized by the combination of the five axioms Constant Returns,
Additivity, Universal Bounds (2.14), Ranking, and property (2.22).
2.5. Variants of the model and further axioms
a) Distributivity (Moulin and Shenker [1999])
The Distributivity axiom expresses the commutativity of the computation of cost shares with
respect to the composition of cost functions:
() Distributivity DIS
12 1 2 1 2 ( , ) ( , ( , )) for all  , ,and all  CCx C Cx C C x ϕϕ ϕ =∈  
The addition of cost (or production) functions corresponds to technologies operating in
parallel: a given demand of output (resp. a contribution of output) yields two types of costs, e.g.,
advertising costs and production costs, (resp. enters two production functions). Their
composition corresponds to technologies running sequentially: 
21
21 2 () ( ) , xyC x y C y →= →=
the input of 
2 C  is the output of 
1 C  (and a similar interpretation if 
12 , CC represent production
functions). Both axioms, Additivity and Distributivity, allow us to decompose the computation
of cost shares if the cost or production function itself is decomposed.
One consequence of Distributivity (with no counterpart in the case of Additivity) is
reversibility of fairness:
1 (,) ( ,)  f o r  a l l   , yC xxC y x y ϕϕ
− =⇔ =47
Given a pair (x, y) with one profile of outputs and one profile of inputs, we can either take the
profile of demands as given and check that y is the corresponding fair profile of costs shares for
the given cost function, or we can take the vector y as given and check that x is fair for the given
production function. These two tests are equivalent for a distributive method.
Distributive methods include average cost sharing, serial cost sharing, as well as any
incremental method. Yet the Shapley-Shubik method (2.19) is not distributive, and in fact a
proper convex combination (with fixed coefficients) of distributive methods is never distributive!
Moulin and Shenker [1999] characterize the rich family of additive and distributive methods
(meeting Constant Returns). In this family, average cost sharing is the only self-dual method (a
result related to Proposition 1.6), and serial cost sharing the only method meeting the universal
lower bound (or upperbound) (2.14).
b) Negative cost shares and the decreasing serial method
In some contexts it makes sense to allow negative cost shares ( 0) i y <  or to charge for a null
demand ( 0 and  0) ii xy => .
Suppose marginal costs increase (as in the monopsonist example of Section 2.1). Then an
agent who demand little or nothing (who refrains from demanding much) is helping the agents
with a large demand, so we may want to compensate him by giving him some money (paid for
by other agents). Symmetrically, consider an output sharing problem and suppose marginal
returns decrease. Think of the “tragedy of the commons” story: input is fishing effort and output
is the total catch in the common property lake. Then an agent who refrains from adding more
input may argue that she deserves a share of total catch (and end up with  0 and  0). ii xy =>  Note
that the dual of the two stories above, where we switch from cost sharing to output sharing or
vice versa do not ring as plausible. To punish an agent who does not work if the production
function in convex ( 0 for   small) ii yx < , or to charge one who does not demand any output if the
cost function is concave, crosses the line of acceptable coercion by the mechanism designer!
The decreasing serial cost sharing method (De Frutos [1998], Suh [1997]) follows exactly the
formulas ((2.11), (2.12), (2.13)) except that individual demands are arranged in decreasing order:
12 ... n xx x ≥≥ ≥ (so that the sequence 
i x  is decreasing, too). With two agents and  12 xx ≥ :48
11 2 1 2 1
11
(2 ); ( ) (2 )
22
yC x y C x x C x == + −
If C is strictly concave,  i y  is positive whenever  i x  is zero and  j x  is positive; on the other
hand, no agent receives a negative cost share (this is clear in the case  2 n =  and can be checked
in general on (2.11), (2.12)). If C is strictly convex,  i y  is negative whenever  i x  is zero and  j x  is
positive.
The decreasing serial cost sharing method fails both universal bounds (2.14) and has not
received an axiomatic characterization at the time of this writing.
Hougarth and Thorlund-Petersen [1998] proposes an interesting mixture of the increasing
and decreasing serial methods, arguing that we should keep the former if C is convex and the
latter if C is concave. Their method is not additive with respect to cost functions.
c) Consistency?
The Consistency axiom played a key role for the analysis of rationing methods, but it is
absent from that of cost sharing methods. Using the linear isomorphism between rationing and
cost sharing methods, one would like to characterize the subset of  (, ) CR ADD  associated
with consistent rationing methods. This may even suggest an appropriate definition of
Consistency for general cost sharing methods. A definition of Consistency is offered by Tijs and
Koster [1998]: it suffers from the same drawback as the definition discussed in Remark 3.1
below, namely it does not work in a domain of non decreasing cost functions.
A related and equally natural question is to characterize the subset of  (, ) CR ADD
associated with the (symmetric) parametric methods (Section 1.5). Both questions are wide open.
11 2 1 2 1
11
(2 ); ( ) (2 )
22
yC x y C x x C x == + −
If C is strictly concave,  i y  is positive whenever  i x  is zero and  j x  is positive; on the other
hand, no agent receives a negative cost share (this is clear in the case  2 n =  and can be checked
in general on (2.11), (2.12)). If C is strictly convex,  i y  is negative whenever  i x  is zero and  j x  is
positive.
The decreasing serial cost sharing method fails both universal bounds (2.14) and has not
received an axiomatic characterization at the time of this writing.49
Hougarth and Thorlund-Petersen [1998] proposes an interesting mixture of the increasing
and decreasing serial methods, arguing that we should keep the former if C is convex and the
latter if C is concave. Their method is not additive with respect to cost functions.
c) Consistency?
The Consistency axiom played a key role for the analysis of rationing methods, but it is
absent from that of cost sharing methods. Using the linear isomorphism between rationing and
cost sharing methods, one would like to characterize the subset of  (, ) CR ADD  associated
with consistent rationing methods. This may even suggest an appropriate definition of
Consistency for general cost sharing methods. A definition of Consistency is offered by Tijs and
Koster [1998]: it suffers from the same drawback as the definition discussed in Remark 3.1
below, namely it does not work in a domain of non decreasing cost functions.
A related and equally natural question is to characterize the subset of  (, ) CR ADD  associated
with the (symmetric) parametric methods (Section 1.5). Both questions are wide open.
3. Heterogeneous outputs or inputs
3.1. The problem
In the cost sharing version of the more general model now under scrutiny, each agent i
demands a different good, and the technology specifies the total cost Cx x x n (,,, ) 12  .  In the
output sharing version, each agent i contributes the amount xi of an “input i” and total output
Fx x n (,, ) 1   must be shared among the participants.  Thus we identify “good i” and “agent i”.
Examples of such cost sharing problems include sharing the cost of a network connecting
geographically dispersed users (so the heterogeneity of demand comes from the heterogeneity of
space, as in road networks), or of a telecommunication network in which the users need different
service (e.g., different bandwidth, or different degrees of reliability in service, or they use the
network at different times of the day).  Another example is the cost sharing of a large project
(dam, space station) between various beneficiaries (e.g., power company, farmers, tourism
industry, in the dam example: see Straffin and Heaney [1981]).
Examples of both cost sharing and output sharing are commonplace in the accounting
literature (see Thomas [1977]).  The various divisions of the firm contribute heterogeneous50
inputs to a common project, say the launching of a new product: how should the revenue of the
project be distributed among them?  The cost sharing issue arises when the divisions share a
common service, such as the central administration unit.
The main simplifying assumption of the current model is that each agent demands exactly
one output good (or contributes exactly one input). On the other hand, the domain of cost (or
production) functions is very general: C() 00 =  and C nondecreasing in each xi, are the only
restriction we impose when the variables are discrete (Sections 3.2, 3.3); when xi is a real
number, we add some regularity conditions.
The mathematical complexity of the models raises significantly above that in Parts 1 and 2.
We look first at the case of binary demands (each xi is 0 or 1) in Sections 3.2, i.e., the classical
theory of values for cooperative games with transferable utility. We consider variable demands
of indivisible goods (each xi is an integer) in Sections 3.3 and 3.4, and finally variable demands
of divisible goods in Sections 3.5 and 3.6.
In Sections 3.2 to 3.6, we look at additive methods only, as we did in most of Section 2.  We
extend the isomorphism between rationing methods and additive cost sharing methods (Theorem
2.2): in the case of heterogeneous goods, the set of rationing methods is identified with the
extreme points of the set of additive methods meeting the Dummy axiom (Theorems 3.1 and
3.3).
The Shapley-Shubik cost sharing method, and its asymmetric counterparts, the random order
values, emerge forcefully from the axiomatic discussion.  Shapley's characterization result in the
context of binary demands (Proposition 3.1) now has company in the variable demand model,
whether demands are integer valued or real valued (see Corollary 2 to Theorem 3.1 and
Corollaries 1 and 3 to Theorem 3.4).
The two other prominent methods are the Aumann-Shapley pricing method, extending
average cost sharing to the context of heterogeneous goods, and the additive extension of serial
cost sharing: they are discussed in Sections 3.3 to 3.6 and characterized in Section 3.6
(Corollaries 2 and 3 to Theorem 3.4).
Up to 1995, the literature on cost sharing with variable demands was unanimously arguing
for the Aumann-Shapley method.  The initial axiomatic characterization by Billera and Heath
[1982] and Mirman and Tauman [1982] (see also Billera, Heath and Raanan [1978]) was refined
in several ways (Tauman [1988] is a good survey).  One version of this result is in Corollary 2 to51
Theorem 3.4.  Moulin [1995a] spells out a critique of the Aumann-Shapley method based on the
properties of Demand Monotonicity and Ranking.  The former says that the cost share of an
agent should not decrease when his demand of output increases, ceteris paribus.  The latter says
that, when all goods enter symmetrically in the cost function, the ranking of individual cost
shares is the same as that of individual demands.
Both properties DM and RKG are compelling when each good is identified with a different
agent.  They are less compelling if the demand of good i aggregates many small individual
demands, which is the standard interpretation in the literature on the Aumann-Shapley method.
In this survey we stick to the first interpretation and emphasize the critique of the AS method.  In
turn this pushes the Shapley-Shubik and serial methods to the forefront.
Additivity of cost shares with respect to the cost function, the main assumption throughout
Parts 2 and 3, is a powerful mathematical tool, yet not a compelling normative requirement.
Additivity narrows down the set of cost sharing methods drastically, thus bringing a number of
impossibility statements when we require other properties with more normative appeal: an
example is the combination of Demand Monotonicity and Average Cost for Homogeneous
Goods (see Proposition 3.3 and Corollary 2 to Theorem 3.4).  When the impossibility hurts, the
first axiom to go should be Additivity.  The literature on nonadditive methods is reviewed in
Section 3.7: it contains very few papers but its potential for growth is huge.
3.2. Binary demands: the Shapley value
This is the model of the classical cooperative games with transferable utility where the only
restriction is our assumption that the cost function is nondecreasing.
A binary cost sharing problem is a triple (,,) NCx where N is a finite set of agents, C is a
nondecreasing function from { , } 01 N  into R+ such that C() 00 = , and xx iiN = ∈ ( )  is a profile of
demands, where each xi = 01  or  .
For convenience, we denote the vector of demands x as a, possibly empty, subset S of N:
xi f f i S i =∈ 1 .  Thus the cost function C associates to each coalition S, SN ⊆ , a number CS () ,
interpreted as the cost of serving all agents in S and only them.  Our assumptions on C are:
CS T C S C T S T N () ; () () , ∅=⊆ ⇒ ≤ ⊆ 0  for all 52
A solution to the binary cost sharing problem ( , , ) NCS is a profile of cost shares  yy iiN = ∈ () ,
where each  yi is a real number and:




∑ 0 for all  , ( )
A binary cost sharing method is a mapping ϕ  associating to any problem ( , , ) NCS a solution
yN C S =ϕ(,,) .
The idea of sharing costs in proportion to demands reduces in this model to dividing equally
CS ( ) among all agents in S (and charging nothing to those outside S).  However this method
violates the basic principle of reward, namely that cost shares should reflect responsibilities in
generating the costs.  A minimal requirement to that effect is that an agent who "obviously" is
not generating any cost should pay nothing.  The Dummy axiom conveys just that idea.
We use the notation ∂=− iCS CS CS i ( ) ( ) ( \ ) for the marginal cost (saving) of subtracting
agent i from coalition S.  Of course, ∂=∉ iCS i S () 0  i f   .
Dummy (DUM)
{( ) }{ ( , , )} , , ∂= ⊆ ⇒ = = ii i CT T N y NCS NSi C 00  for all    for all   and  ϕ (3.1)
An agent is called a dummy for the cost function C if it costs nothing to serve her, irrespective of
the number of other users being served. The egalitarian method ( ( )/#( ) yC S S i S i =∈  if  ,  yi = 0
otherwise) charges a dummy agent as any other, therefore it violates Dummy.
Additivity (ADD)
ϕ ϕ ϕ (, ,) (, ,) (, ,) , , NC C S NC S NC S NC S k 12 1 2 += +  for  all 
Note that Dummy and Additivity together imply a generalization of the Constant Returns
property (2.2).  If C is linear, Cx cx ii () =∑ , the method simply “separates” costs:
ϕii i i i NCS c x x i Sx i S (,,) , =⋅ = ∈ = ∉   where   if   if  10
We denote  (,) DUM ADD  the family of cost sharing methods meeting Dummy and
Additivity.  These two axioms place no restriction on the method across different populations N
and  ′ N : therefore Proposition 3.1 describes this family in the fixed population context, where N
is fixed and S varies (note that most of the literature, only looks at the case SN = ).  Next we
introduce a mild consistency requirement linking the solutions across variable populations; in
turn, the corresponding methods take a natural structure: Theorem 3.1.53
Given N, an incremental cost sharing method specifies for each nonempty subset S of N
(including N itself) an ordering σσ σ () ( , , ) # () Ss S s == 1   where  .  The cost shares
yN C S =ϕ
σ( , , ) are computed as follows:
12 2 () 1 () () 1 2 1 2 1
() () 1
0 if 
({ ( )}); ({ ( ), ( )}) ({ ( ), ( )}) ({ ( )});
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A random order value is a convex combination of incremental methods where the weights of the
combination are independent of C.  Denoting by  () S  the set of permutations of S, a random
order value is written as
(,,) yN C S ϕ ==
() () SS σ ∈ ∑

()




σ λ ϕ  (3.3)
Note that we can choose an arbitrary set of convex coefficients λσ() S  for each coalition S.  For
instance in S ={, ,} 12 3  we may choose the incremental method with ordering 2, 1, 3 and in
′ = S {, ,} 124  we may choose that with ordering 1, 2, 4.
Finally we need an equity property to state Shapley's original characterization.  If two agents
affect the cost function symmetrically, we require that they receive the same share
Equal Treatment of Equals (ETE)
{ ( ) ( ) for all   such that  , }
{ ( , , ) ( , , ) for all  , } for all  , , ij
CT i CT j T ij T
NCS NCS SS N Cij ϕϕ
∪= ∪ ∉ ⇒
=⊆
Proposition 3.1. (Fixed population, Weber [1988])
The set of random order values coincides with the set  (,) DUM ADD  of the cost sharing
methods meeting the Dummy and Additivity axioms.
Corollary to Proposition 3.1. (Shapley [1953])
The three axioms Dummy, Additivity and Equal Treatment of Equals characterize a single




































 for all 
 if 
(3.4)
Incremental methods ((3.2)) and random order values ((3.3)) defined in the fixed population
context, may allocate priorities (or weigh the various priority orderings) inconsistently when S
changes.  In order to avoid this unpalatable feature, we must switch to the variable population
context and impose a mild consistency requirement.  We denote by   the maximal set from
which agents can be drawn (a finite or infinite set) and by σ  a priority ordering of  .  On each
finite set S, this ordering induces an ordering denoted σ() S , and the corresponding formula (3.2)
defines the σ -incremental cost sharing method.  Similarly, a consistent random order value is a
convex combination of the σ -incremental methods, where σ  varies over all orderings of  N
and the coefficients are independent of N, C and S:
ϕ λ ϕ σ
σ
σ
(,,) (,,) ,, ()
()
NCS NCS NCS S =
∈
∑  for  all 
SN
(3.5)
The following axiom corresponds to the zero-consistency property for rationing methods
((1.6)): a dummy agent can be removed without affecting the distribution of costs among the rest
of the agents:
Dummy-Consistency (DCY)
{( ) }{ ( , , ) ( \ , , \ ) } , , [\ ] ∂= ⊆ ⇒ = iN i CT T N NCS N iCS i S Ni C 0 for all   for all   for all   and  ϕ ϕ
(where the restriction of C to Ni \  is denoted C as well).
Proposition 3.2.  (Variable population)
The set of consistent random order values coincides with the set  (, , ) DUM DCY ADD  of
the cost sharing methods meeting Dummy, Dummy-Consistency and Additivity.
Several alternative characterizations of the Shapley value and the random order values have
been proposed in the literature.  They replace the Additivity axiom by another powerful
requirement; the two most striking results rely on the property of marginalism and the notion of
potential.  We describe these two results in the fixed population context.
In a random order value, the cost share of an agent only depends upon his marginal costs
∂iCT ( ) for the various coalitions containing i.  This property, called Marginalism, is defined as:55
{( ) ( ) } { ( , , ) ( , , ) } , , ∂= ∂ ⊆ ⇒ = ii i i
k C T C T T S NC S NC S NC S i 12 1 2  for all   for all   and  ϕ ϕ        (3.6)
Loehman and Whinston [1974] and Young [1985a] show that the Shapley value is characterized
by Marginalism and Equal Treatment of Equals.  Khmelnitskaya [1999] shows that the
combination of Marginalism, Dummy, and an axiom called Monotonicity characterizes the
random order values when N contains three agents or more.  The monotonicity requirement is as
follows:
{ () () , () () }
{(, ,) (, ,) } , ,
CT CT T N T S CS CS






 for all   and 
 for all   for all   and  ϕ ϕ
If we add Dummy-Consistency to this list of requirements, we characterize the family of
consistent random order values.
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The Shapley value ((3.4)) can be equivalently written as:
ϕii NCS PSC PSC PS iC (,,) (,) (,) (\ ,) =∂ = − (3.8)
Thus agent i's share is simply the i-th derivative of the potential function.  As second derivatives
commute, this implies for all ij N , i n   :
(,,) (,,) (,,) (,,\) (,,) (,,\ ) ji i j i i j j NCS NCS NCS NCS j NCS NCS i ϕϕϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ∂= ∂⇔ − =− (3
.9)
The effect on i's share of removing j is the same as that on j's share of removing i.
Hart and Mas Colell [1989] show that the Shapley value is fully characterized by the
existence of some potential function P of which derivatives deliver the individual cost shares as
in (3.8) and such that PC (,) ∅= 0.  Equivalently, property (3.9) alone is enough to characterize
the Shapley value.
Remark 3.1. A third characterization (also due to Hart and Mas-Colell [1989]) of the Shapley
value follows from a Consistency axiom.  Consider a cost sharing method ϕ .  For any cost
function C and agent i, we define a new function as follows:
CTC Ti N C Ti i
i
, () ( ) (,, )
ϕ ϕ =∪ − ∪ (3.10)56
Note that this function depends on N as well, but under no charge for null demands this plays no
role.
The idea is that agent i wants "service" but is leaving the jurisdiction of the division problem;
he will pay whatever cost share is recommended by the method, whatever is the set of other
agents who want service as well.  The Consistency axiom says that this move should not affect
the allocation of cost shares among the remaining agents:
Consistency
ϕ ϕ
ϕ (,,) ( \ , ,\ ) ,, [\ ]
, NCS N iC S i NCS i Ni
i =  for all   and 
The result is that if we choose the standard value (i.e., the Shapley value) for two person
problems, the Consistency axiom forces the Shapley value for every set N.
There are two problems with the above axiom.  First of all the definition of the reduced cost
function 
, i C
ϕ  does not preserve the monotonicity of costs: we may have
ST C S CT ii ⊂>  and  ,, () ()
ϕ ϕ .  In fact this inequality does occur even if ϕ  is the Shapley value
itself.  For an example, take N ={, ,} 12 3  and the cost function
CN C C C Ci i () () () ; () ( ) , , === = = = 13 23 1 12 0 12 3  for 
Compute
CC C C C C 3
3
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,, () ( ) ( , { } ) ( ) ( ) ( , { } )
ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ =− = − = = − = − =  and 
Thus the only way to make sense of the axiom is to allow for decreasing cost functions.  But in
this enlarged domain, the very foundations of our model must be revised: allowing negative cost
shares is compelling (think of an agent whose presence eliminates all costs); the axioms of
Demand monotonicity, and the Upper and Lower Bounds below must be abandoned, and so on.
The second difficulty is the interpretation of the axiom.  It does not represent a clear-cut
reduction of the allocation problem to the subset Ni \  of agents, because the agent i must still be
ready to pay a different share when the set of other agents who want service changes.  This is in
sharp contrast with the Consistency property in the rationing (or surplus sharing) problem; where
agent i puts his money on the table (or takes his share of the output) and departs without leaving
an address: the remaining division problem can be conducted entirely without him.
The above difficulty applies to all forms of Consistency for the binary model (the classical
cooperative game framework) such as the concept due to Davis and Maschler [1965] used to57
characterize the nucleolus by Sobolev [1975].  See Section 3.7.  It also applies to the Consistency
for general cost functions proposed by Friedman [1999].
3.3. Variable demands of indivisible goods: the dr-model
Each agent i demands a number xi of units of the idiosyncratic good i, xX ii ∈{,,, , } 012
where  Xi is the capacity of this good.  For the main representation theorem below, we must
assume that  Xi is finite, although the model makes sense for  Xi =+ ∞ as well.
A cost function C is now a mapping from [ , ] [] 0 X N  (the Cartesian product of the integer
intervals [ , ] 0 Xi ) into R+ such that
Cx x C x C x () () ( ) 00 =≤ ′ ⇒≤ ′  and 
As in Section 2, the vector x is called the demand profile, xX N ∈[, ] [] 0 .  The definitions of a cost
sharing problem ( , , ) NCx is now complete.  A solution is a vector y in RN  such that
yy C x i
N
³= å 0( ) (3.11)
As usual a cost sharing method j  associates a solution to each problem. This model
generalizes the binary model of the previous subSection where we had  X i =1 for all i.
Our first task is to generalize Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 to the variable demand context.  As in
Section 3.2, we give first the fixed population version of the result, based on the two axioms
Dummy and Additivity: Theorem 3.1.  Next we give the variable population result, with the help
of the additional axiom Dummy-Consistency: corollary to Theorem 3.1.
Dummy (DUM)
where the notation  , and  , stands for the
marginal cost when i raises her demand from  xx ii -1  t o   .  The interpretation is as in Section 3.2:
the demand of a dummy agent, no matter how large, does not cause any extra cost, hence this
agent should never be charged.
Additivity (ADD)58
The incremental cost sharing methods of the binary model (Section 3.2) as well as of the
model with homogeneous goods (Section 2.4, see (2.18)) generalize.  We fix an ordering s  of N
(recall that N is fixed for the time being) and define the s -incremental method (or method with
priority ordering s )   as follows:
(3.12)
where  (, ) [] x T 0  denotes the vector with the same projection as x on T, and zero on  .
The incremental methods obviously meet DUM and ADD and so do their convex
combinations.  Yet there are many more methods in C (, ) DUM A DD .  We construct a family of
such methods, called the path-generated methods: these methods are the key to the
representation results below.
Pick a monotonic rationing method r for indivisible goods: their set is denoted  dd R  and they
are discussed in Section 1.9.  The society N is fixed for the time being so we write   instead
of  rNtx (, , ) , where  .
Recall that the path  tr t x ® (, )  is equivalently described by a sequence 
where agent i appears exactly  x i  times.  To each rationing method r in  dd R , or equivalently to
each family of sequences  sx ()  (one for each x in [, ] [] 0X N ) we associate the following cost
sharing method  :
(3.13)
where  dr t x i i it (, ) = = 1 if   is the t-th element of the sequence  sx () , and  dr t x i (, ) =0 otherwise.
The cost sharing method (3.13) is called path generated because for each x the cost shares
are computed along the path  tr t x ® (, )  i.e., along the sequence  sN x (, )  as follows:  Cr x (( , ) ) 1  is
charged to agent  i1,   is charged to agent  i2 , and so on.  The definition
(3.13) makes very clear that this method satisfies the two axioms ADD and DUM.  As convex59
combinations respect these three properties, we find that any convex combination of path
generated methods do, too.  In fact there are no other methods.
Theorem 3.1. (Fixed population) (Wang [1999])
Every cost sharing method meeting Dummy and Additivity is a convex combination of path
generated methods (where the coefficients may depend on N and x but not on C).  No other cost
sharing method meets these two properties.  Identifying a rationing method   with the
path-generated cost sharing method (3.13) we write this result as follows:
C  [ dd R ] (DUM, ADD)
(where  denotes the set of extreme points of Z, and CO the convex hull)
We turn to the variable population framework of the result.  As in the binary model
(Section3.2) we require that dropping a dummy agent from the society be of no consequence.
Dummy Consistency (DCY)
The following fact is easy to prove: a path-generated method is dummy consistent if and only if
the corresponding rationing method is consistent.  It is easy to check that Consistency of r
amounts to the following property of the generating sequences  sN x (, ) : the sequence
 obtains from  sN x (, )  by removing all occurrences of i.  Thus we call a method
generated by consistent paths if it is derived from a consistent rationing method via (3.13).60
Corollary 1 to Theorem 3.1. (Variable population)
Every cost sharing method in C (, , ) DUM DCY ADD  is a convex combination of methods
generated by consistent paths.  There are no other methods in C  (DUM, DCY, ADD):
C dd R () ] CSY Û dd R () CSY = & & C (DUM, DCY, ADD)
Note that a convex combination of paths can be interpreted as one of the probabilistic rationing
methods discussed in Section 1.9. This interpretation is especially useful for Examples 3.2 and
3.3 below.
We illustrate the results by three crucial symmetric cost sharing methods.
Example 3.1. The Shapley-Shubik method
The arithmetic average of all incremental methods is also called the Shapley-Shubik method
(Shubik [1962]) namely
(3.14)
This method is not path-generated; it is a proper convex combination of path-generated methods,
namely the incremental methods.  Contrast this with the Shapley-Shubik method for
homogeneous goods (2.19), that is path-generated (like all methods in  M( , ) CR ADD : see the
discussion in Section 2.4).
Remarkably, the Shapley-Shubik method can be characterized by one single additional axiom
within C( , ) DUM A DD , namely a lower bound on individual cost shares that depends only on
N, C and  x i :
Lower Bound
(3.15)
This bound generalizes to the heterogeneous goods context the universal lower bound (2.14)
of Part 2.  In the homogeneous good context, the Lower Bound is met by many costs sharing
methods, such as serial cost sharing, Shapley-Shubik and more.  Its impact in the current model
is much more dramatic.
Corollary 2 to Theorem 3.1. The Shapley-Shubik method is the only method in
C( , ) DUM A DD  meeting the Lower bound axiom.61
Example 3.2. The Aumann-Shapley method (dr model) (Moulin [1995a], de Nouweland et
al. [1995])
This is the discrete version of the Aumann-Shapley cost sharing method for divisible goods
that plays a major role in the next subpart.
For a given problem  (,, ) NCx, the method is the uniform average of all path-generated
methods, in other words it gives an equal weight to each path between 0 and x. Hence the
Aumann-Shapley method corresponds, in the representation (3.13), to the random proportional
rationing method described in Section 1.9.
Straightforward computations give the formulas of the AS cost shares.  For any vector t in
N
N , we use the notation
that is, the number of monotonic paths from 0 to t in [,] 0t.  Then we have
(3.16)
(with the convention  l( ) 00 = )
An important feature of the AS method is to coincide with average cost sharing when the
goods are homogeneous, that is to say when C takes the form  . Sprumont and
Wang [1998] argue that the AS method is the most natural extension of proportional cost sharing
to the context of heterogeneous goods.
Example 3.3. Serial cost sharing (dr model) (Moulin [1995a])
In the homogeneous good model (Part 2), serial cost sharing is associated with the uniform
gains rationing method via equation (2.16).  Similarly, in the case of heterogeneous goods serial
cost sharing is associated, via equation (3.13), with the Fair Queuing (probabilistic) method
described in Section 1.9. The corresponding cost shares are as follows in the case of two agents:62
3.4. Demand Monotonicity in the dr-model
Demand monotonicity
This Demand Monotonicity can be viewed as a mild incentive compatibility requirement.
Absent DM, the cost sharing method is vulnerable to "sabotage" when the output goods are
freely disposable: an agent can raise artificially her demand, throw away the excess good and
receive a smaller bill!
The fixed-path cost sharing methods are derived from the fixed path rationing methods
(Section1.8) via formula (3.13).  Recall that for a given society N and a capacity  X i  for each
agent i, a fixed path rationing method is defined by a single path g( ) N  from 0 to  :
The corresponding cost sharing method reads as follows, where the variable N is omitted in g
for simplicity:
This formula makes clear that a fixed path cost sharing method is demand monotonic: increasing
x i  to  ¢ x i  enlarges the set of indices t at which the marginal cost  ¶Ù iCtx (( ) ) g  is charged to
agent i, moreover   for all t in the initial set.
Because DM is preserved by convex combinations, every convex combination of fixed path
cost sharing methods (where the coefficients are independent of C and x) meets DM as well.
Examples include the Shapley-Shubik and serial methods.  Theorem 3.3 below states the
converse statement.  Before writing this important result, we note that the Aumann-Shapley
method (Example 3.2) is not demand monotonic.
Proposition 3.3.  (Moulin [1995a])
Let   be a cost sharing method in C (, ) DUM ADD  that coincides with average cost sharing
when the goods are homogeneous, i.e., when the cost function takes the form  .
Then   is  not demand monotonic.63
Theorem 3.2. (Fixed population)
i) A path-generated cost sharing method is demand monotonic if and only if it is a fixed path
method.
ii) A cost sharing method meets Dummy, Additivity and Demand Monotonicity if and only if it is
a convex combination of fixed path methods (where the coefficients depend on N but not on C or
x):
C [ dd R  (fixed paths)]
In the variable population formulation of theorem 3.2, the extreme points of the relevant set of
methods are the consistent fixed path cost sharing methods, for which the rationing method
defined by the fixed paths  NN ® g( ) is consistent.  As noticed in Part 1 (see (1.21)), this means
that g  commutes with the projection over subsets, namely
(3.17)
Corollary to Theorem 3.2. (Variable population)
Every cost sharing method in C    is a convex combination of
consistent fixed path methods.  No other method meets these four axioms:
C [ dd R
Remark 3.2. Two characterizations of the random order values
The random order values are the convex combinations of incremental cost sharing methods
(3.12).  They are an important subset of C (, , ) DUM A DD DM  because of their simplicity.  Two
characterizations of this subset within C( , ) DUM A DD  have been proposed in the dr-model.
The first one (Wang [2000]) uses one additional axiom, a dr-counterpart of the Unit Invariance
axiom of the rr-model described below in Section 3.6.  The second one (Sprumont [2000]) relies
on Demand Monotonicity and the property Informational Coherence.
Unit Invariance is defined below by equation (3.26), with the operator   given by (3.24)
and (3.25).  Because  , the axiom is written equivalently as
In the dr-model, the domain of C is N
N , so if  l  is an integer, the function   is well
defined over N
N  (see (3.25)).  The dr-version of Unit Invariance (that Sprumont calls64
Measurement Invariance) requires the above equality to hold for every N, C, x, i and every
integer  l .
In order to define Informational Coherence, consider the following reformulation of Unit
Invariance in the rr-model.  For every vector  , we write  m Ä x  their coordinatewise
product:  () mm Ä = xx ii i .
Cx C x x
m
m () ( ) Ä =f o r  a l l   (3.18)
(where  m i  is positive for all i). Unit Invariance (3.26) is equivalent to the following property
(3.19)
In the dr-model, the rescaling vector  m  is integer valued, hence for a given C and a given  m ,
property (3.18) does not define a unique cost function  : it only specifies its value on a subset
of N
N .  The axiom Informational Coherence requires that for all problems (N, C, x) and all
(integer valued) rescaling vector  m , there exists at least one cost function   meeting
properties (3.18) and (3.19).
Ironically, the dr-version of the Aumann-Shapley method fails both Informational Coherence
and Unit Invariance (dr-version); by contrast in the rr-model, Unit Invariance is one of the keys
to the characterization of the Aumann-Shapley method (corollary 2 to Theorem 3.4). See
Sprumont [2000] for more comments and interpretations.
3.5. Variable demands of divisible goods: the rr-model
The only change from the model in the previous subpart is that the output goods are perfectly
divisible and the demand profile x is in R +
N .  The cost function C remains nonincreasing and
C( ) 00 = .  However we must now assume that C is sufficiently regular to apply the general
results about linear operators in functional spaces.
We assume throughout that the cost function C is twice continuously differentiable.  This is
not the only conceivable regularity assumption on C.
All the dr-axioms discussed in Sections 3.3, 3.4 (with the exception of Remark 3.2) are
defined in exactly the same way in the rr-model.  For instance agent i is a dummy in C iff the65
partial derivative  ¶ iC  is identically zero, which amounts to saying that C is independent of the
variable  x i , as in the dr-model.
Much of the theory in the rr-model parallels that in the dr-model: this is true for the
representation of the sets C (, ) DUM A DD and C  (Theorem 3.3) and for
the impact of DM in these two sets (Theorem 3.4).  The only new feature is the Unit Invariance
axiom that has no counterpart in the dr-model (see, however, Remark 3.2).  In this subpart we
state Theorem 3.3 and present the main examples.  The discussion of Demand Monotonicity and
Unit Invariance are the subject of Section 3.5.
As in the dr-model, the key to the representation of C( , ) DUM A DD  is the path-generated
methods.  We denote by  rr R  the set of monotonic rationing methods (with divisible claims and
shares) studied in Sections 1.2 to 1.8.  Recall that a method r in this set is a mapping
yr N t x =(, , )  where  tx y ii ,, vary in R + , where  yt N =  and  r i  is non decreasing in t.  These
assumptions imply that  r i  is continuous in t as well.  The path-generated cost sharing method j
associated with  rr R  is defined as follows:
(3.20)
where the integral is the Stieljes integral of a continuous function with respect to a monotonic
function, and  dr i  represents the derivative of  rt x i (, )  with respect to t.  This definition
corresponds to (3.13) in the dr-model.
Theorem 3.3. (Fixed population), Friedman [1999], Haimanko [1998]
A cost sharing method satisfies Dummy and Additivity if and only if it is an (infinite) convex
combination of path-generated methods:
C [ rr R ] Û rr R & & C
¼
(, ) DUM A DD
In the above statement, a convex combination may be infinite; in other words it is a positive
probability measure over the (infinite dimensional) set of monotonic rationing methods (see
Friedman [1999] for details).  By contrast, in the dr-model the set  dd R  is finite.  This difference
notwithstanding, Theorem 3.3 is the exact counterpart of Theorem 3.1.66
In the variable population context, the extreme points of the relevant set of methods are the
methods generated by consistent paths: they are derived via formula (3.20) from a consistent
rationing method; equivalently, the paths g( , ) Nx commute with the projection operator
Hence the counterpart of Corollary 1 to Theorem 3.1.
Corollary 1 to Theorem 3.3. (Variable population)
i) A path-generated cost sharing method is Dummy-Consistent if and only if it is generated by a
consistent path.
ii) A cost sharing method meets Dummy, Dummy-Consistency and Additivity if and only if it is an
(infinite) convex combination of methods generated by consistent paths.
We can now attach a cost sharing method to any rationing method discussed in Part 1.  For
instance, the contested garment method (Section 1.4) yields the following (path-generated) cost
sharing method among two agents:
(and a symmetrical formula if  xx 21 £ ).
From the rich family of monotonic rationing methods, only three generate a cost sharing
method that has received some independent attention in the literature.  These are proportional
rationing, uniform gains rationing and priority rationing (and convex combinations of the latter).
We start by the family of random order values, and their symmetric member the Shapley-
Shubik method.  They are defined exactly as before: formulas (3.12) and (3.14) are unchanged.
So is the characterization of the Shapley-Shubik method by the Lower Bound axiom, Dummy
and Additivity: Corollary 2 to Theorem 3.1 remains true, word for word.
Next we turn to the method generated by proportional rationing.
Example 3.4. The Aumann-Shapley method (rr-model) (Aumann and Shapley [1974])
This method has been the subject of the most voluminous research and its characterization by
Billera and Heath [1982] and Mirman and Tauman [1982] initiated the literature on cost sharing
with variable demands.67
The AS method is path-generated: its path is the simplest path between 0 and x, namely the
straight line; equivalently, the AS method is derived from the proportional rationing method via
formula (3.20).  Thus it generalizes average cost sharing for homogeneous goods (Part 2) to the
heterogeneous goods model.  The method is written as follows:
(3.21)
It can be shown that the above AS method is the limit of the AS methods in the dr-model
(Example 3.2).  Given N and x, we approximate each interval   by a sequence of
increasingly fine discrete grids, and define a sequence of dr-cost sharing problems by simply
restricting the initial cost function to the profiles of the grid.  Then the AS cost shares (3.18) of
the discrete approximating problems converge to the cost shares (3.21).
Example 3.5. Serial cost sharing (rr-model) (Friedman and Moulin [1999])
As in the homogeneous goods model, serial cost sharing is generated by the uniform gains
rationing method.  Thus it is path-generated.  Using the notations   and
e=(,, ,) 11 1 K , the uniform gains method writes
Change the variable t in (3.13) to  l : the latter varies from 0 to  ma xii x  when t varies from 0 to
x N ; moreover  ¶Ù = iCex () l0  whenever  .  Hence the integral formula for serial cost
sharing:
(3.22)
For instance, take  N= { ,} 12  and x such that  xx 12 £ :
The conscientious reader will check that (3.22) yields the cost sharing formula (2.13) if the cost
function C takes the form  .
We look now at some examples of the cost function C for which our three methods are both
easy to compute and interestingly different.
Consider first a Cobb-Douglas cost function. Fix some positive numbers  i a  and define:68
The Shapley-Shubik method splits total cost equally between all users; similarly, the
Aumann-Shapley method assigns the fraction  / iN aa to user i. Thus both methods disregard the
relative size of individual demands, which creates a strong “tragedy of the commons” effect. The
serial method yields a more appealing set of cost shares, notwithstanding the fact that it relies on
the interpersonal comparison of individual demands. For instance,
Consider next the cost function of an excludable public good:  .  Note that
this function is not continuously differentiable, so we need to approximate the given function by
regular cost functions and take the limit.  This is straightforward.  Examples include the cost
sharing of a capacity, as in the celebrated airport landing game (Littlechild and Owen [1973])
where each user requests a certain length of runway suitable for his own airplanes.
The Shapley-Shubik and serial cost sharing methods coincide for his own airplanes.  Assume
xx x n 12 ££ £ K , then the cost shares are
(3.23)
These cost shares make good sense: they separate total cost   into n components
 and split the cost of each component between the agents who “use” this
component.
By contrast, the Aumann-Shapley method recommends an unpalatable division of costs:
The agent with the largest demand bears the full cost: this follows from (3.21) because on the
straight line [, ] 0x the only nonzero partial derivative is  .  These cost shares change
discontinuously whenever the identity of the largest demander changes; they make it extremely
costly to raise one's demand by a very small amount.69
The next example of the function C is easier to interpret as a production function, i.e., in the
surplus sharing model, so we write it as  .  The inputs of the various agents are
perfect complements in the production of the single output (as in several coordination games of a
macroeconomic inspiration; see, e.g., Bryant [1983]).  The Shapley-Shubik and serial cost shares
again coincide: they simply split total output equally   for all i.  This time the
Aumann-Shapley method gives the full surplus to the agents with the smallest input contribution!
Thus agent 1's share drops to zero when he raises his input contribution above the next smallest
contribution, in sharp contradiction of Demand Monotonicity.
The above two examples make a powerful point against the Aumann-Shapley cost sharing: it
makes little sense when the cost or production function exhibits strong complementarities. In
axiomatic form, this critique of the AS-method hinges on two axioms: Demand Monotonicity
and Ranking
Ranking
Ranking is a strengthening of Equal Treatment of Equals.  When all goods affect the cost
function symmetrically, their quantities are structurally comparable and Ranking is a compelling
equity requirement.
Serial cost sharing and the Shapley-Shubik methods both meet Ranking and Demand
Monotonicity. In the case of the function  Fx ii (m in ), the Aumann-Shapley method (strongly)
violates both axioms. Note that the dr-version of the Aumann-Shapley method (Example 3.2)
also violates Ranking.
3.6. Unit invariance and Demand Monotonicity in the rr-model
We explore the impact in the set C( , ) DUM A DD  (and in C ) of two
important requirements: Demand Monotonicity and the new axiom Unit Invariance.  Theorem
3.4 gives a complete answer to both questions, and leads to three characterization results of,
respectively, the Shapley-Shubik, Aumann-Shapley and serial methods.70
Given an agent i and a positive number  l , we denote by   the  l -rescaling of the i-th
coordinate:
(3.24)
Given a cost function C, the  l -rescaling of  x i  transforms C into  :
tt ll
ii
Cx C x x () ( ) ( ( ) ) / = 1  for all  (3.25)
Unit Invariance (UI)
(3.26)
Unit Invariance says that changing the unit in which a particular good is measured would not
affect cost shares: whether I measure a quantity of corn in kilos, pounds or bushels should not
matter.  This is compelling when the different goods entering the cost function are not only
different but also noncomparable (e.g., corn and fruits).  Less so if the goods are of the same
nature, but do not enter symmetrically in the cost function.  Even less so if the goods affect C
symmetrically.
Unit Invariance is violated by serial cost sharing, as its generating path (namely the uniform
gains path) along the diagonal is not invariant by rescaling.
As in the dr-model, it is enough to analyze the impact of the two axioms DM and UI on the
extreme points of the (convex) sets C( , ) DUM A DD  and C( , , ) DUM A DD DM , namely the
path-generated methods and the methods generated by fixed paths: Theorem 3.4 says that there
are no other extreme points in the relevant set of methods.
A path-generated method is demand monotonic if and only if it is a fixed path method,
namely a method derived via formula (3.20) from a fixed path rationing method (Section 1.8).
Recall that such a rationing method is constructed, via formula 1.19, from a family of paths
g( ) N  joining 0 to  , where  X i  is agent i's capacity,  X i £+ ¥ . Hence the corresponding cost
sharing method is written as follows:
(3.27)71
Naturally, a fixed path cost sharing method is Dummy consistent if and only if the corresponding
fixed path rationing method is consistent, or equivalently if the fixed paths  NN ® g( ) commute
with the projection operator: property (3.17).
A path-generated method is unit invariant if and only if the corresponding family of paths
 are such that:
or equivalently, the corresponding rationing method is such that
In this case we speak of a unit invariant path generated method.
Theorem 3.4. (Friedman [1999])
i) A cost sharing method satisfies Dummy, Additivity and Demand Monotonicity if and only if it
is an (infinite) convex combination of fixed path methods:
[  (fixed path)]
ii) A cost sharing method satisfies Dummy, Additivity and Unit Invariance if and only if it is an
(infinite) convex combination of unit invariant path methods.
C( , , ) DUM A DD S I [ (SI)]
iii) C   [ rr R  (consistent fixed path)]
iv) C [ rr R (CSY, SI)]
As in the dr-model, the random order values are the convex combinations of the incremental
cost sharing methods (3.12) (where the coefficients are independent of C and x).  They have a
very simple characterization.
Corollary 1 to Theorem 3.4. (Friedman and Moulin [1999])
A cost sharing method satisfies Dummy, Additivity, Demand Monotonicity
and Unit Invariance if and only if it is a random order value.
If we add Dummy-Consistency to the list of requirements, we characterize the set of
consistent random order values: these methods are described as in the binary model (see (3.5)).
Similarly, if we add Equal Treatment of Equals to the list of axioms in Corollary 1, we
characterize the Shapley-Shubik method.
Remark 3.2 in Section 3.4 describes two characterizations of the random order values in the
dr-model; they are the counterpart of Corollary 1 in the case of indivisible units of demand.72
Remark 3.3. Wang [2000] offers a characterization of the random order values and the Shapley-
Shubik method where the two axioms DM and UI are replaced by a single property called
ordinality.  The latter strengthens UI by requiring the invariance of cost shares when we change
the measurement of any one good in a nonlinear way.  Let  l  denote an increasing (and
differentiable) one-to-one mapping of R +  into itself.  We generalize the definition of  l -
rescaling ((3.24) (3.25)) as follows
(3.28)
The ordinality axiom is defined exactly as Unit Invariance, with  l  now varying over all
increasing bijections of R + .
The set of random order values is characterized by the combination of Dummy, Additivity
and Ordinality.  Adding Equal Treatment of Equals singles out the Shapley-Shubik method.
We turn to the celebrated characterization of the Aumann-Shapley method.
Corollary 2 to Theorem 3.4. (Billera and Heath [1982], Mirman and Tauman [1982])
i) The Aumann-Shapley cost sharing method is characterized by the four properties Dummy,
Additivity, Unit Invariance and the following:
Average Cost for Homogeneous Good (ACH)
(3.29)
ii) There is no cost sharing method in C( , ) DUM A DD  meeting Average Cost for Homogeneous
Goods and either one of Demand Monotonicity or Ranking.
Note the tension between the axioms UI and ACH, the former bearing on the case of
heterogeneous, noncomparable goods, the latter on the case of identical goods.
Statement ii) in Corollary 2 includes the rr-version of Proposition 3.3.  In fact, the
incompatibility of ACH and RKG (in C( , ) DUM A DD ) holds true in the dr-model as well.  The
proof uses exactly the same numerical example as in the proof of Proposition 3.3.
Remark 3.4. Young [1985b] offers an alternative characterization of the Aumann-Shapley
method using neither Dummy nor Additivity.  Instead, he proposes the Strong Aggregation
Invariance (SAI) axiom that considerably strengthens ACH, and a Symmetric Monotonicity (SM)
axiom combining the intuition of Marginalism ((3.6)) with the interpersonal comparison of
marginal costs.73
Corollary 3 to Theorem 3.4
i) The serial cost sharing method is characterized by the four properties Dummy, Additivity,
Demand Monotonicity and Upper Bound.
Upper Bound (UB)
(3.30)
ii) The serial cost sharing method is characterized by the four properties Dummy, Additivity,
Demand Monotonicity and
Serial cost shares for Homogeneous Good (SCH)
(3.31)
iii) The Shapley-Shubik method is the only method in C( , ) DUM A DD  meeting Lower Bound
((3.15)).
Note that statement i) still holds if we weaken UB by restricting attention to homogeneous
cost functions (i.e., we only require the inequality when C takes the form  ).  Statements
i) and iii) have direct counterparts in the dr-model (see, respectively, the discussion after the
corollary to Theorem 3.2 and Corollary 2 to Theorem 3.1).  Statement ii) can be adapted to that
model as well, by adding Equal Treatment of Equals to the requirements.
3.7. Nonadditive cost sharing methods
a) The Stand Alone core approach
In the theory of classical cooperative games (namely the model in Section 3.2) surplus
sharing methods that are not additive in the production (or cost) function have been proposed for
three decades (Schmeidler [1969]).  For simplicity we fix the population N throughout this
Section.
Consider the binary problem  (, ,) NCN, denoted (N, C) for simplicity, and suppose that the
cost function C is subadditive, namely:
This property is plausible in every problem where “serving coalition S” is orthogonal to “serving
coalition T ”: the costs incurred by T (resp. S) are the same whether or not S (resp. T) is served.
Under subadditivity of costs, a natural equity requirement on the solution y to the problem
(,) NC is the Stand Alone core property:74
(3.32)
If this property fails, the coalition of agents S has an objection to y: if S were standing alone it
would benefit from a reduced cost share, whereas the cost share of   would increase.
In view of budget-balance,  yC N N =() , the above system of inequalities is equivalent to
This is the No Subsidy principle: S should pay at least the incremental cost of service (if this
inequality fails, coalition   has a Stand Alone objection).
The following fact is well known: subadditivity of the cost function C is not sufficient to
guarantee the existence of a solution y in the Stand Alone core (i.e., meeting (3.32)).  The
characterization of those cost functions generating a nonempty core is one central theme of the
theory of cooperative games, and is well understood: see Owen [1982] or Moulin [1988],
[1995b] for textbook presentations.
The Stand Alone core property for a cost sharing method j  takes the following form (for a
given population N and demand N):
 (3.33)
An interesting result connects the Stand Alone core to the incremental cost shares 
(3.2): the Stand Alone core is contained in the convex hull   of all incremental cost
shares when s  varies over all permutations of N (Weber [1988]).  In other words any allocation
y in the Stand Alone core is achieved by at least one random order value. However, the choice of
a particular random order value (the choice of the convex coefficients over the methods j
s )
depends upon the particular cost function C.  If we pick the same random value j  for all cost
functions C, it must be the case that for some choices of the subadditive cost function C, the
Stand Alone core is nonempty and does not contain the solution   (this is an easy
consequence of Theorem 1 in Young [1985a]).  In view of Theorem 3.1, there is no additive cost
sharing method meeting the Stand Alone core property (3.33).75
Thus if we are committed to the Stand Alone core property, a nonadditive method must be
used.  The abundant literature on classical cooperative games has proposed a number of such
methods; the most prominent among these is the nucleolus (Schmeidler [1969]), selecting a
central point in the Stand Alone core by equalizing as much as possible the cost savings
CS y S () -  across all coalitions of N.  See Owen [1982] or Moulin [1988] for a textbook
presentation.
The Stand Alone core approach is easily adapted to the model with variable demands.  Given
a profile of demands x, the Stand Alone cost of coalition  ; inequality (3.32)
becomes   and the subadditivity of the cost function C writes  Cx x () + ¢
£+ ¢ Cx Cx () ( ) .
An important exception to the incompatibility of the Stand Alone core and Additivity is when





If C is submodular, the inclusion of the Stand Alone core in the range of the random order values
becomes an equality (Ichiishi [1981]):
(in the binary and variable demands model respectively).  In particular any random order value
meets the Stand Alone core property and the latter property is thus always true for additive cost
sharing methods in the binary model.  The same holds true in the variable demands model.  The
Stand Alone requirement comes for free in the world of additive methods.  An instance of this
general fact is statement ii, in the Corollary to Theorem 2.2: with a homogeneous good and
, submodularity of C is equivalent to the concavity of  .
b) Extending homogeneous good methods
One of the natural requirements in the heterogeneous good model is that the cost sharing
method coincides with a given method whenever the goods are actually homogeneous.  In other
words, we wish to impose the solutions j( , , ) NCx whenever C takes the form  .76
The ACH axiom (3.29) and the SCH axiom (3.31) are the key to characterize respectively the
Aumann-Shapley and serial methods (Corollaries 2 and 3 to Theorem 3.4).  Note that in the case
of the AS method, we do not know of any characterization result that would dispense with ACH.
Among additive methods, the two properties ACH and SCH also lead to severe impossibility
results.  Within the set C( , ) DUM A DD  of additive methods, each one of the following pairs of
requirements are incompatible:
i) ACH and Demand Monotonicity
ii) ACH and Ranking
iii) SCH and Unit Invariance
iv) ACH and Serial for excludable public good, namely   for all  xy }{ Þ
given by (3.23)}
v) ACH and Ordinality (Remark 3.3)
vi) SCH and Ordinality
The first two incompatibilities are statement ii) in Corollary 2 to Theorem 3.4.  The next two are
also easy to derive from Theorem 3.4 and the last two follow Sprumont's result in Remark 3.3.
I regard each one of these impossibility results as a strong argument against the Additivity
requirement.  Each pair of axioms is normatively meaningful, whereas Additivity is only a
structural invariance property.
Sprumont [1998] proposes a handful of nonadditive methods for which the axioms listed
above are compatible.  For instance, in the two agents case he constructs a method satisfying
ACH, DM and Ordinality as follows.  We are given a problem  (, , ) NCx, and assume that all
partial derivatives of C are strictly positive and bounded away from zero.  We say that two
problems   are ordinally equivalent if there are rescaling functions  l i , one for
each  , such that:
Given the problem  (,) Cx one shows that there exists a unique problem   such that
Then the ordinally proportional rule is defined as77
This definition has been generalized to an arbitrary number of agents: Wang and Zhu [2000] and
Wang [2001].  It is also limited by restrictive regularity conditions.  Nonetheless the combined
properties of ACH, DM and Ordinality are a remarkable achievement.
At least two ordinal extensions of serial cost sharing have been proposed.  We describe one
of them, called the Moulin-Shenker rule by Sprumont [1998] who was the first to analyze it
formally.  See also Koster [1988a], [1988b] and Koster, Tijs, and Borm [1998].  We are given a
problem  (,) Cx where we assume, again, that all partial derivatives are positive and bounded
away from zero.  The number of agents is arbitrary.  The following ordinary differential equation
has a unique solution  tr t x ® (, ) , namely a monotonic rationing path from 0 to x.  This path
depends on the cost function C itself, but for simplicity we omit this from the notation:
(3.34)
By definition of the counting operation  atx (, ) we have
hence  tr t x ® (, )  is indeed a rationing path.  Then we define the Moulin-Shenker cost sharing
method:
The intuition behind this method is simple: as long as his demand is not met, the “active” agent i
is served at a speed that equalizes the marginal cost of service among all active agents:
Sprumont [1998a] proposes another ordinal extension of serial cost sharing in the vein of the
ordinal extension of average cost sharing described above.  He gives axiomatic characterizations
for both extensions.  Koster [1998a] offers a related characterization of the Moulin-Shenker rule.78
c) More nonadditive methods and an open question
The study of nonadditive cost sharing methods has just begun and it shows great potential.
In the homogeneous good model, Hougaard and Thorlund-Petersen [2001] propose a nonadditive
method mixing the increasing and decreasing versions of serial cost sharing: see Section 2.5
point b).  In the same homogeneous good model, Tijs and Koster [1998] propose a very natural
nonadditive generalization of incremental cost sharing.  Fix an ordering  , say
.  Denote by L the Lebesgue measure of a measurable set in R + .  The method in
question charges to agent 1 the cheapest marginal costs in [, ] 0x N :
(3.35)
Finally, a largely unexplored model is the cost sharing problem where several outputs are
jointly produced and each agent demands some amount of every good.  Kolpin [1996] extends to
that context the incompatibility of Additivity, SCH and Unit Invariance; see also Téjédo and
Truchon [1999].  McLean and Sharkey [1996], [1998] adapt the Aumann-Shapley method to that
context and extend the classical characterization result (Corollary 2 to Theorem 3.4).79
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